Application number: 1-1030-79531 for punkt.wien GmbH

punkt.wien GmbH

Matznergasse 17
Wien 1140
AT

+431981160

+43198116108

http:⁄⁄www.punktwien.at

Mr. Nikolaus Futter

Chief Executive Officer

+43198116112

+43198116108

nikolaus.futter@punktwien.at

Mr. Johannes Lenz-Hawliczek

Consultant (Partner DOTZON GmbH)

+493049802721

+493049802727

johannes@dotzon.com

GmbH is the abbreviation for Gesellschaft mit beschraenkter Haftung (Company with Limited Liability) under Austrian Law.

The Gesellschaft mit beschraenkter Haftung, abbreviated GmbH, or Company with Limited Liability, is formed under the “Oesterreichisches Gesetz vom 6. Maerz 1906 ueber Gesellschaften mit beschraenkter Haftung (GmbH-Gesetz - GmbHG), zuletzt geaendert durch das Bundesgesetz BGBl. I Nr. 53⁄2011” http:⁄⁄www.ris.bka.gv.at⁄GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10001720

Not Available

Compass-Gruppe GmbH

Not applicable.

Hermann Futter
Chief Executive Officer
Nikolaus Futter
Chief Executive Officer
Ronald Schwaerzler
Chief Executive Officer

Compass-Gruppe GmbH
Not Applicable

wien

Not Available

punkt.wien GmbH does not expect that the introduction of this TLD will cause any operational or rendering problems. TLD Box as the backend service provider for .WIEN is confident that launching and operating .WIEN does not come with any unknown challenges, drawing on the experience of its parent company nic.at which has a more than a decade long experience of successfully operating the .at ccTLD:
- The string WIEN is not complex and is represented in standard ASCII characters and follows relevant technical, operational and policy standards;
- The string length is within lengths currently supported in the root and by ubiquitous Internet programs such as web browsers and mail applications;
- There are no new standards required for the introduction of this TLD;
- No special requirements are being made on registrars, registrants or Internet users, and;
- The existing secure, stable and reliable TLD Box SRS, DNS, WHOIS based on nic.at proven system and supporting systems and staff are amply provisioned and prepared to meet the needs of this TLD.

The .WIEN top-level domain is designed to serve the needs of the community of the City of Wien (english: Vienna) on the Internet by its own top-level domain. The local .WIEN domain names which become available with this TLD are concise and create an unique and individual identity for citizens, companies and institutions. Those providing and looking for information, goods and services in Wien can thus intuitively come together. The .WIEN domain names strengthen the feeling of community amongst citizens and vistors of Wien, improve communication and make interaction easier, thus providing a stimulus for innovation and development. Both for citizens and for non-citizens the City of Wien becomes more attractive as a place to visit, as a commercial location and as a place to live.

* Wien *
The City of Wien is both the national capital of Austria and one of Austria’s federal provinces (Bundeslaender). With a total size of 414 square kilometres and a population of about 1.7 million (2.4 million within the metropolitan area, more than 25% of Austriaʹs population), it is by far the largest municipality in the country, as well as its cultural, economic, and political center. It is the 9th-largest city by population in the European Union and serves as the seat of many international organisations, including the United Nations and OPEC. The city lies in the east of Austria and is close to the borders of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. In 2001, the city center was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

*The Vision of .WIEN *
.WIEN is the top-level domain of the Community of Wien. The local domain names available with .WIEN are concise and create a unique and individual identity for citizens, organisations, institutions and local authorities that are based in the metropolitan area of Wien or have a business, cultural, touristical, social, private or other relationship with the city. Companies and individuals providing and looking for information, goods and services in Wien can thus intuitively come together. The .WIEN domain names strengthen the feeling of community amongst citizens and visitors of Wien, improve communication and enhance interaction.
The allocation of .WIEN domain names shall incorporate, in a fair and transparent manner, the many and varied interests of the citizens and institutions of Wien and their community in the top-level domain .WIEN. The .WIEN policies shall ensure that citizens of Wien, Viennese worldwide, their institutions and their organizations may benefit individually by a unique identity with a .WIEN domain name.

* The Purpose of .WIEN * 
The purpose of the .WIEN top-level domain is to serve the needs and the many and varied interests of the Wien Community on the Internet. 

The Community consists of individuals and legal entities that can demonstrate an economic, cultural, touristical, social, historic or other relationship to the Austrian capital Wien.

The purpose reflects and incorporates the relationship towards the local conditions and the local interests of the relevant authorities, citizens and organizations. The needs of the Community in terms of the .WIEN top-level domain are defined in order to serve the purpose:

(i) To give the City of Wien, the citizens of Wien, Viennese worldwide, their locations and their organisations a unique destination proposition (UDP) by an own digital identity on the Internet with individual .WIEN domain names.

(ii) To create a new name space with attractive .WIEN domain names which are (i) demanded by the Community and (ii) which each member of the community may register and (iii) which are likely to create more and better search engine positions for the Community members.

(iii) To facilitate an intuitive search and access approach for Wien-associated content and service for citizens, tourists, investors, organizations and the administration by a reasonable namespace management including (i) the reservation and delegation of generic category domain names for special purposes such as marketing, directory services or for the support of the city’s homepage, (ii) measures to mitigate domain grabbing, cyber squatting, speculation and other unlawful activities

(iv) To stimulate an active use of .WIEN domain names by citizens, organizations and administration for websites, email and other domain name related services by creating awareness and offering support to do so especially for citizens and SMEs.

i. What is the goal of your proposed gTLD in terms of areas of specialty, service levels, or reputation?

* SPECIALITY - Integrally connected namespace *
In our vision the .WIEN top-level domain becomes the essential namespace for the communication and interaction of all the various stakeholders of Wien such as Internet users, companies, local government, the media and public institutions. By becoming the essential source for community members, the .WIEN namespace integrally connects them on the Internet.

* REPUTATION and SERVICE LEVEL - Secure and trustworthy namespace *
The .WIEN namespace managed under the legislation of Austria and technically operated by the operator of the .AT ccTLD brings with it security, reliability, trust and credibility in the same manner as already established by .AT ccTLD. The registration policies and the start-up planning ensure that community members may register a .WIEN domain name. Internet users can trust that services offered under .WIEN domains are from or for the community. This is a service level that is sought after by the global Internet community and which will contribute to the already positive reputation of Wien.

* Intuitive and memorable namespace *
Domain names under .WIEN are descriptive, precise and create identity for people and institutions related to Wien. .WIEN enables citizens and organisations to come together in a more intuitive manner than today. This is a special ability that is difficult to provide within existing top-level domains, but will become a standard in future top-level domains.


ii. What do you anticipate your proposed gTLD will add to the current space, in terms of competition, differentiation, or innovation?

* COMPETITION - Local strength and enhanced options for the Wien Community *
With .WIEN, community members will be enabled to choose from a wide pool of contextually relevant domain names and register those which best suit their communication needs. The .WIEN top-level domain will be welcome, since the national ccTLD .AT is well populated with more than 1 million registered domain names; the city of Wien having by far the highest domain penetration in Austria. As an addition to gTLDs, ccTLDs and future gTLDs, .WIEN will be an ideal supplement. 

With a bigger choice Community members will experience a more competitive pricing for suitable domain names. Community members will have numerous options when registering a domain because .WIEN opens up a completely new namespace where all domain names are still available. .WIEN also helps websites to achieve higher search engine relevance. The strong and unique local character of the .WIEN domain names brings about a natural competition in the global domain name business by introducing a dedicated namespace for a clear-cut community.

* Prosperous and promising namespace *
This environment creates new business opportunities and fosters the development of innovative services for the benefit of the Wien Community and its members. With .WIEN domains, the Wien Community can improve their search engine rankings by delivering more relevant search results. This will benefit in more traffic on their respective .WIEN websites and increase their position in the local market. From a user perspective, citizens and visitors of Wien will have a quicker and easier way to find businesses under names such as taxi.wien, public information under names such as finanzamt.wien or accommodations under a name such as hotel.wien.

* DIFFERENTIATION - A meaningful TLD *
The .WIEN TLD and its .WIEN domain names are clearly differentiated to existing TLDs, not only due to their descriptive and self-explanatory nature which has a clear meaning and value to the targeted registrants and Internet users but also due to its dedicated owners.

* INNOVATION – Connected services and a local Sunrise *
We are planning to support the Wien Community with innovative domain name connected services such as offering directory services and search engine optimization. Communication of these features, best practices, benchmarks, etc. will take an important part of the communication efforts and this is planned to be done in close cooperation with local media partners.
Another innovation in .WIEN will be the introduction of a local sunrise phase with a special focus on the trademark rights of local businesses. 

iii. What goals does your proposed gTLD have in terms of user experience?

Users will understand that in the .WIEN namespace only eligible registrants can register their names, thus heightening the local identity and connectedness. The intuitive and descriptive domain names under a meaningful TLD like .WIEN will enable consumers to navigate and search more easily for information and services in and about Wien on the Internet. It is also expected that search engines will give ranking preference to .WIEN domain names compared to similar URLs used with other TLDs. This will increase the visibility along with the strong marketing efforts for .WIEN by punkt.wien GmbH and its media and other strategic partners from the Wien community.

iv. Provide a complete description of the applicant’s intended registration policies in support of the goals listed above.

.WIEN second-level domain names are restricted to the community of Wien and its organizations (Registrants). punkt.wien GmbH intends to register domain names under .WIEN according to the following policies. The following text is a shortened and descriptive version of the full registration policy text which highlights the relevant information.

* Start-up Schedule *
The .WIEN TLD will have a simple and straight forward start-up schedule with the phases noted below:

 Phase 1 – Reservation of names for defined interest groups of the WIEN community including
- Reservation of names for local authorities and their departments (public offices and functions etc.)
- Reservation of names for defined interest groups of the Wien community including names for the representation of the economic and non-commercial interests of the city of Wien (associations, location marketing, culture, etc.) in accordance with the purpose of the .WIEN top-level domain
- Reservation of names for the technical operation, the namespace management, marketing and purpose of the .WIEN top-level domain as defined in #18a
- Reservation of premium names for auctions, tenders and fixed price sales 
- Reservation of names in accordance with the ICANN specification 5 (2-characters, country names, others)

Phase 2a – Sunrise for IP rights owners from the Wien Community (without interfering with ICANN’s Trademark Clearinghouse rules). Eligible are all registrants who meet the eligibility criteria of .WIEN described below and whose names and trademarks are valid in Austria and have been registered before publication of the .WIEN policies. The Local Sunrise has a duration of 30 days; names with multiple registrations will be auctioned.

Phase 2b – Sunrise under the Trademark Clearinghouse rules. Eligible are all registrants who meet the eligibility criteria of .WIEN described below and whose trademarks were validated by the Trademark Clearinghouse. The TMCH Sunrise has a duration of 30 days; names with multiple registrations will be auctioned.

Phase 3 – Landrush; registration of domain names for the Community of Wien. Eligible are all registrants who meet the .WIEN eligibility criteria described below. Allocation follows the first-come, first-served principle.

Phase 4 – Allocation of premium domain names by auction at a later stage, eligible are all registrants who meet the .WIEN eligibility criteria described below.

* ELIGIBILITY *
Since .WIEN is intended to serve the community of Wien in general, the group of eligible registrants is limited. Exclusively eligible to register a domain name under the top-level domain .WIEN is any natural person, legal person, organization or association of persons, if they can demonstrate that they have an economic, cultural, historical, social or any other connection to the Austrian capital Wien.

* CONTENT ⁄ USE * 
To meet the requirements of ICANN to a community-based designation of the application, the registrant must use the .WIEN domain in an economic, cultural, touristical, historic, social or any other meaningful connection to the Austrian capital.
Restrictions may include, but are not limited to a requirement that each registered domain name is used in conjunction with standard IP protocols such as http, https, smtp⁄mail, ftp, etc.. 
The .WIEN Registry will, from time to time in its sole discretion or upon evidence or advice conduct continuing or recurring audits of domain names registered to ensure continued compliance with these requirements. Failure to comply will result in a notice providing 20-days to comply. Non-compliance following such a notice period may result in take-down of the relevant domain name, at the discretion of the Registry.

* Name Selection *
A .WIEN domain name can only consist of digits (0-9), hyphens, and the lowercase letters a-z. It must neither start nor end with an hyphen. If the domain name has hyphens at the third and fourth place, the name must be the A-label of a valid IDN, according to the description and table contained in question 44. IDNs under .WIEN are supported in the Latin script. The minimum length of a domain is one (1), the maximum length sixty-three (63) characters. If the domain is an IDN, the maximum length is determined in accordance with RFC 5890 and RFC 5891.

* Equivalent Rights *
If no special allocation method is provided for a domain name, it is assigned categorically to this eligible registrant whose application has been first received by the Registry in the technically correct manner and in accordance with the .WIEN registration policy and has been first written in the .WIEN Registry database (also called priority principle, ʺfirst come, first servedʺ). By registering the domain name it is no longer available for further registrations until the registration expires and is not renewed or until the domain is canceled.


v. Will your proposed gTLD impose any measures for protecting the privacy or confidential information of registrants or users? If so, please describe any such measures.

The use of proxy and privacy services to protect the privacy or confidential information of registrants or users will be allowed in the own discretion of registrars and registrants and will be defined in the .WIEN Whois-Policies.

vi. Describe whether and in what ways outreach and communications will help to achieve your projected benefits.

The .WIEN top-level domain will be operated by punkt.wien GmbH, which is a subsidiary of Compass-Gruppe GmbH. Compass is, with a number of other subsidiaries, a leading media, publishinig and IT company in Wien and Austria, offering databases, directories, hosting services and more. For the .WIEN project, Compass and punkt.wien GmbH cooperate closely with the media department of the City of Wien, as well as with a number of publishing and broadcast partners from the Community of Wien, to plan and implement a comprehensive communication strategy with the aim to gain awareness within the community. We will continue to communicate the benefits of .WIEN domains names within the community. We are confident that our broad outreach program, which is part of our marketing efforts, will help us to achieve the projected benefits of .WIEN. 

* COMPETITION - Local strength and enhanced options for the Wien Community *
With .WIEN, community members will be enabled to choose from a wide pool of contextually relevant domain names and register those which best suit their communication needs. The .WIEN top-level domain will be welcome, since the national ccTLD .AT is well populated with more than 1 million registered domain names; the city of Wien having by far the highest domain penetration in Austria. As an addition to gTLDs, ccTLDs and future gTLDs, .WIEN will be an ideal supplement. 

With a bigger choice Community members will experience a more competitive pricing for suitable domain names. Community members will have numerous options when registering a domain because .WIEN opens up a completely new namespace where all domain names are still available at launch. .WIEN also helps websites to achieve higher search engine relevance. The strong and unique local character of the .WIEN domain names brings about a natural competition in the global domain name business by introducing a dedicated namespace for a clear-cut community.

* Prosperous and promising namespace *
This environment creates new business opportunities and fosters the development of innovative services for the benefit of the Wien Community and its members. With .WIEN domains, the Wien Community can improve their search engine rankings by delivering more relevant search results. This will benefit in more traffic on their respective .WIEN websites and increase their position in the local market. From a user perspective, citizens and visitors of Wien will have a quicker and easier way to find businesses under names such as taxi.wien, public information under names such as finanzamt.wien or accommodations under a name such as hotel.wien.

* DIFFERENTIATION - A meaningful TLD *
The .WIEN TLD and its .WIEN domain names are clearly differentiated to existing TLDs, not only due to their descriptive and self-explanatory nature which has a clear meaning and value to the targeted registrants and Internet users but also due to its dedicated owners.

* INNOVATION – Connected services and a local Sunrise *
We are planning to support the Wien Community with innovative domain name connected services such as offering directory services and search engine optimization. Communication of these features, best practices, benchmarks, etc. will take an important part of the communication efforts and this is planned to be done in close cooperation with local media partners.

Another innovation in .WIEN will be the introduction of a local sunrise phase with a special focus on the trademark rights of local businesses. 

Yes

* Clearly delineated and pre-existing *
The string “WIEN” is a unique word that has a clear and unique meaning: It stands for the capital of the Republic of Austria.
Exclusively eligible to register a domain name under the top-level domain .WIEN are members of the .WIEN Community which are natural persons, legal persons, organizations or associations of persons, if they can demonstrate that they have an economic, cultural, touristical, historical, social or any other connection to the Austrian capital WIEN.
By this definition the .Wien Community is clearly delineated, well organized, and pre-existing. The City of Wien (Vienna) has a history which goes back to Roman times. It has been the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Today Wien is the capital of the Republic of Austria, being its primary city, with a population of about 1.723 million (2.4 million within the metropolitan area, more than 25% of Austriaʹs population), and is by far the largest city in Austria, as well as its cultural, economic, and political center. It is the 9th-largest city by population in the European Union. Wien is host to many major international organizations, including the United Nations and OPEC. The city lies in the east of Austria and is close to the borders of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary; the geographical size of the city of Wien itself is approximately 414.65 sq km (160.10 sq mi).
Diversity and vitality have always characterized the city of Wien and its inhabitants. Politics, business enterprises, cultural and social institutions, and each individual citizen of Wien present their city to the world not only as the capital of Austria, but as a unique city. The unique identity of the city in particular lends the city its typical charm. With the introduction of .WIEN the city will add another identity-defining feature. Entrepreneurs, artists, service providers, civic institutions and individuals will have the opportunity to present themselves under a common TLD and to show at the same time that they together are ʺWienʺ – despite all the individual facets.
* STRUCTURE and ORGANIZATION *
The City of Wien has a special position within Austria because it is the federal capital, i.e. the seat of the Republic of Austria’s highest authorities, a federal province of the Republic of Austria, and a municipality with the legal status of a chartered city.
Wien as the federal capital of Austria
As the seat of the republic’s highest authorities (federal parliament, head of state, federal government and the highest courts), Vienna is the economic and political centre of Austria.
Wien as a federal province of Austria
Since 1 January 1922, Vienna has been one of the nine autonomous federal provinces that form the Republic of Austria. As a federal province, Vienna has a right to its own legislation and provincial executive body. In addition, it is entitled to designate eleven of its own representatives for the second chamber of federal legislation, the so-called Federal Assembly, which is also known as “Chamber of Provinces”. Legislation in Vienna is in the hands of the Vienna Provincial Parliament. The highest executive body is the Vienna Provincial Government, which is headed by the Governor. The Provincial Parliament has 100 members; the Provincial Government is formed by the Governor and currently 12 members of government called City Councillors. Administrative tasks are performed by the Office of the Provincial Government under the direction of the Head of the Office of the Provincial Government.
Wien as a municipality
The Federal Constitutional Act stipulates that every municipality in Austria must have three mandatory bodies, which are to be supported by an administrative apparatus. The mandatory bodies to be established by every municipality are: a) the City Council, b) the City Government (in Wien: the City Senate), and c) the Mayor.
A Municipal Council Office must be established to perform tasks of municipal administration. In Wien, the City Administration assumes this role, while it also constitutes a body in its own right. Based on the Wien City Statutes, a number of other, non-mandatory bodies and offices have been established (i.e. bodies not stipulated by the Federal Constitutional Act). These include the Executive City Councillors, the committees and commissions of the City Council, and the District Councils. The Wien City Statutes (“Wiener Stadtverfassung”, abbreviated WStV) serve as Wien’s municipal statutes. Their first section takes the form of a provincial law, while the second section – which defines the tasks and functions of Wien as a federal Province – has the status of a constitutional act at provincial level.
Wien is composed of 23 districts (Bezirke). Administrative district offices in Wien (called Magistratisches Bezirksamt) serve similar to those in the other states (called Bezirkshauptmannschaft), the officers being subject to the Landeshauptmann (which in Wien is the mayor); with the exception of the police, which in Wien is governed by the President of the Police (at the same time one of the nine Directors of Security of Austria), a federal office, directly responsible to the Minister of the Interior.
* ESTABLISHMENT and ACTIVITIES *
The City of Wien has been established as the core of the .WIEN Community and has a history which goes back to the time of the Roman Empire. In the first century AD, the Romans set up a military camp, called Vindobona, which was situated in what is today the core of the city. The course of the wall is reflected, to this day, in a series of streets in the inner city.
The activities of the City of Wien include all political, economic, cultural, touristical, social and other activities a metropolis may pursue.
* SIZE, MEMBERSHIP and GEOGRAPHIC EXTENT *
The size of the .WIEN Community is mainly defined by the natural Community of the City of Wien which comprises of about 1.7 million inhabitants, about 115,000 registered companies and all institutional organizations such as the relevant local authorities of the City of Wien.
The membership eligibility to the .Wien Community is defined in #20e.
The geographic extent of the City of Wien is about 414 squarekilometers. More information can be found at the offical website at http:⁄⁄www.wien.gv.at⁄english⁄

* Relations to community organizations *
Representatives of Compass-Gruppe’s family management and of punkt.wien GmbH’s management play active roles in numerous community organisations such as ISPA – Internet Service Providers Austria. Hermann Futter, CEO, has been the first authorised internet expert in Austria and a member of dispute resolution team of nic.at. He is a member of the board of Parents’ Association of the Theresian Academy Vienna and a member of the Investors Advisory Board of the startup financing fund “speedinvest”. Nikolaus Futter, CEO, is, among others, a member of the ALUMNI-Club, Vienna University of Commerce and a member of the Association of Former Theresianists, Theresian Academy Vienna. Ronald Schwaerzler, CEO, is a Member of the Domain Name Council of Internet Privatstiftung Austria (IPA) and a founding member and member of the board of ISPA - Internet Service Providers Austria (http:⁄⁄www.ispa.at⁄).
The introduction of .WIEN is being supported by relevant organisations and local authorities in the city. The City of Wien fully supports our application for .WIEN as is evidenced by the attached Letter of Support. .WIEN will be used according to policies developed by the City of Wien and the applicant. The City of Wien has worked closely with applicant in the development of this application.
* Relations to the community and its constituent parts⁄groups *
The applicant punkt.wien GmbH is a subsidiary of Compass-Gruppe. The core of Compass-Gruppe is the Compass-Verlag GmbH which was founded in 1867 by Gustav Leonhardt. The Compass-Verlag GmbH has been the leading provider of economic information in Austria for almost 145 years and is one of Wien’s most traditional companies. Punkt.wien GmbH files this application with the explicit support and on behalf of the City of Wien (on the basis of a license agreement).
* Accountability mechanisms *
The applicant punkt.wien GmbH has entered into an agreement with the city of Wien to operate .WIEN under license by the city. The agreement clearly defines the conditions under which punkt.wien GmbH is allowed to operate the .WIEN top-level domain. The .WIEN top-level domain will be used according to policies developed by the City of Wien and the applicant which have cooperated closely on the development of this proposal.
After the successful application by punkt.wien GmbH, the City of Wien will enter into a separate agreement with the company which will outline the conditions under which the City of Wien supports the company in the operation of .WIEN, and circumstances under which the City of Wien would withdraw its support. Thus, punkt.wien is fully accountable to enforce the policies and eligibility restrictions it has agreed upon with the City of Wien in lieu of the Wien Community.
The applicant will install a council similar to the well-proven Domain Council of nic.at. The council will determine the basic principles for the assignment policy of domain names. Members of the council will be national experts, representatives of Internet users and service providers as well as representatives of the City of Wien.

* Intended registrants *
Since .WIEN is intended to serve the community of Wien in general, the group of eligible registrants is limited. Exclusively eligible to register a domain name under the top-level domain .WIEN is any natural person, legal person, organization or association of persons, if they can demonstrate that they have an economic, cultural, touristical, historical, social or any other connection to the Austrian capital Wien (Vienna).
* Intended end-users *
Intended users of .WIEN second-level domain names are members of the Wien Community and Internet users worldwide.
* Related activities the applicant has carried out or intends to carry out in service of this purpose *
Generic domains such as hotel.wien, etc. are particularly valuable and useful domains, which should be allocated and operated in reasonable way and in the interest of the Wien community. Special precautions must therefore be taken to prevent activities such as domain grabbing or the speculative registration of interesting domains. Punkt.wien will allocate those generic industry terms in cooperation with appropriate bodies such as the Domain Council.
* Explanation of how the purpose is of a lasting nature *
The applicant’s parent company Compass has been in existence for almost 145 years, proof of the company’s sustainable business approach. The .WIEN top-level domain and its purpose are of a long-lasting nature since digital marketing and distribution and individual digital addresses (domain names) have become an integral component of general business and individual⁄ personal practices and thereby also for the Wien Community as a whole. It is foreseeable and anticipated that digital instruments and tools such as .WIEN domain names will play an ever increasing role for any society’s interaction within the next decade and beyond. The .WIEN top-level domain will thereby serve the Wien Community and its members in a lasting nature and will fulfill its purpose of providing verified, meaningful and easily recognizable domains.

* Relationship “Name and Community” *
The proposed top-level domain name, “WIEN”, has been the name of the capital of the Republic of Austria – and before that of the Austro-Hungarian Empire – for several hundred years. It is thus a string which is known worldwide to identify the Wien Community and its members. Therefore there is a very strong relationship between the applied-for string and the name of the community.
* Relationship “Name and Community members” *
The Wien Community consists of more than 2 million individuals, enterprises, associations and institutions. There cannot be a stronger relationship between the members of the Wien Community and the applied-for string, since the string “WIEN” is the word that is uniting them all.
* Other connotations *
The word WIEN has no other significant meaning and is being known worldwide to mean to stand for the capital of the Republic of Austria.

The following text is a shortened and descriptive version of the full registration policy text which highlights the relevant information regarding the applicant’s intended registration policies in support of the community-based purpose.
* Eligiblity *
.WIEN second-level domain names are restricted to the community of Wien and its organizations (Registrants). punkt.wien GmbH intends to register domain names under .WIEN according to the following policies.
Since .WIEN is intended to serve the community of Wien in general, the group of eligible registrants is limited. Exclusively eligible to register a domain name under the top-level domain .WIEN is any natural person, legal person, organization or association of persons, if they can demonstrate that they have an economic, cultural, touristical, historical, social or any other connection to the Austrian capital Wien (Vienna).
With the registration of a .WIEN domain name each registrant implicitly signs the registration policies and agrees with the fact that he acknowledges compliance with the registration guidelines. Anyone can check compliance with the registration requirements by initiating an extrajudicial dispute resolution procedure (ʺ.WIEN Eligibility Requirements Dispute Resolution Policy (ERDRP)ʺ).
* Name selection: what types of second-level names may be registered in the gTLD *
A .WIEN domain name can only consist of digits (0-9), hyphens, and the lowercase letters a-z. It must neither start nor end with an hyphen. If the domain name has hyphens at the third and fourth place, the name must be the A-label of a valid IDN, according to the description and table contained in question 44. IDNs under .WIEN are supported in the Latin script. The minimum length of a domain is one (1), the maximum length sixty-three (63) characters. If the domain is an IDN, the maximum length is determined in accordance with RFC 5890 and RFC 5891.
The Registrant undertakes as part of the registration guidelines not to register any domain names that violate the statutory provisions of the European Union and the Republic of Austria, that intervene in the rights of others or violate them, or for abusive, speculative or anti-competitive purposes. Concomitantly, the registrant obliges himself not to spread criminal, illegal, offensive, racist, discriminatory or pornographic content under the top-level domain .WIEN. The Registrant further undertakes not to register domain names which create the erroneous impression that these are domain names, content or services by public bodies or their affiliated organizations, so-called plagiarising authority domain names.
The registrant agrees not to register domain names that violate ethical or criminal law principles (illegal, violent, racist, ethnically offensive, harmful to minors, indecent, offensive or domain names that violate morality and public order) or may hurt the reputation of the City of WIEN. In addition, domain names are not permitted that use the words or parts of words that could be generally perceived as offensive. These include insulting, abusive or agitational words or words or word elements, which could violate the ethical, religious or moral sensibilities of Internet users.
* Content and Use Restrictions *
To meet the requirements of ICANN to a community-based designation of the application, the registrant must use the .WIEN domain in an economic, cultural, touristical, historic, social or any other meaningful connection to the Austrian capital.
Restrictions may include, but are not limited to a requirement that each registered domain name is used in conjunction with standard IP protocols such as http, https, smtp⁄mail, ftp, etc..
The .WIEN Registry will, from time to time in its sole discretion or upon evidence or advice conduct continuing or recurring audits of domain names registered to ensure continued compliance with these requirements. Failure to comply will result in a notice providing 20 days to comply. Non-compliance following such a notice period may result in take-down of the relevant domain name, at the discretion of the Registry.
* Enforcement *
The Registry is entitled to lock, cancel, initiate the gTLD-deletion cycle or transfer domain names that do not meet the registration criteria. It will set-up a process for any questions and challenges that may arise from registrations. Complainants will be provided a single point of contact via the registry’s website to submit any questions and complaints regarding alleged abuse. The registry also follows the standard dispute policies as defined in Q 28 and Q 39.
In detail the following measures will be carried out by the Registry to enforce the policies:
- Policies against domain name abuse and an Eligibility Requirements Dispute Resolution Policy (ERDRP)
- Dispute Policy based on local law
- Anti-Abuse Policies
By these policies the Registry is allowed to block, delete or transfer domain names.

Not Available

Yes

punkt.wien GmbH will protect names as per the requirements in the New TLD Registry Agreement (Specification 5, paragraph 5) by reserving the country and territory names at the second level and at all other levels within the TLD at which the Registry Operator provides for registrations. A list of those names will be compiled and published to relevant audiences before the TLD is introduced. These domains will be blocked following the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) advice “Principles regarding new gTLDs”, at no cost to the relevant organization, so that no parties may register them as a domain name. 

Together with the respective governments and ccTLDs as well as with ICANN we will define procedures and set-up agreements by which the above reserved domain(s) may be released to the Registry Operator and may be registred consecutively by eligible and appropriate parties.

Technical operations of the Registry will be outsourced to “TLD-Box Registrydienstleistungen GmbH” („TLD-Box“,ʺTLD-Box GmbHʺ, TLD-Box, Registry-Back-End Operator), and a signed contract for the provision of those services with TLD-Box exists. A more detailed description of that outsourcing relation is described in response to question 31.

The Registry operating the proposed gTLD will provide the following Registry Services (Services are numbered according to the Questions and Notes in ICANN’s application guidebook):

(A), (i): “Receipt of data from registrars concerning registration of domain names and name servers”: The interface for receipt of such data (Shared Registry Service – SRS) is fully based on the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) and conforms to the relevant RFCs (see answer to Question 25). Beyond the standard EPP object mappings and commands, no proprietary EPP extensions are used (unless ICANN requirements necessitate the use of draft level specifications, i.e. for the Trademark Clearing House integration). This Registry Service is operated on a cluster of at least two physically independent servers as an active-active load-balanced group which interact with a clustered registry database backend (detailed in response to Question 33). Access to that interface is controlled by two-factor authentication mechanisms with one factor being the IP address of the registrar’s EPP client and the second factor being the registrar’s credentials (username⁄password). Traffic is encrypted with TLS. Access attempts from an IP addresses that is not registered with the Registry Operator are denied. A detailed specification of the EPP interface is contained in answer to Question 25, while the architecture of the EPP frontend is included in response to Question 32. The software used to provide the EPP service is readily available at the time of this writing. The software is based on the EPP software used to provide Registry services for the “.at”, “.no” and “.bh” ccTLDs with the domain lifecycle and periods adapted to the requirements for new gTLDs. The EPP service is available over both IPv4 and IPv6 transport.

(ii): “Provision to registrars of status information relating to the zone servers for the TLD”: The registry operator will operate an announcement mailing list where updates regarding the operational status of the zone servers of the TLD will be posted. Additionally, registrars can query for the zone server status of an individual domain name under the TLD via the EPP or WHOIS interfaces – both interfaces will contain the relevant EPP status values (refer to the answer to Question 27 Registration Life Cycle which lists the domain’s zone server status depending on the domain status).

(B), (iii): “Dissemination of TLD zone files”: Zone generation and the subsequent DNSSEC signing of that zone is performed in parallel on two physically separate zone generators based on the current data in the registry database. After performing offline checks for the integrity of the zone file, the TLD zone file is loaded onto two hidden master nameservers (the zone file of the second zone generator is only used in case of an emergency situation with the first zone generator). These hidden masters supply the public nameserver network with the current zone file. For zone dissemination the standard DNS mechanisms of NOTIFY and IXFR⁄AXFR, protected by TSIG, are used. Integrity checks are performed to detect errors such as incomplete zone generation, incorrect DNSSEC key usage, key signing keys not matching DS records in the parent zone or an NSEC⁄NSEC3 chain problem. 

The DNS query based verification procedures include the following set of checks on the published KSK and ZSK: 

** Check if the published KSK matches a published DS-Record in the parent zone 
** Check if the signature of the SOA and the Zone-NS-Records are included and correct 
** Query (with DO-bit set) for 20 predefined existing domain names, check the results and validate the received signatures
** Query (with DO-bit set) for 20 predefined non-existing zone names, check the results and validate the received signatures
** Query (with DO-bit set) for 20 new (or changed) domains since the last zone generation, check the result and validate the received signatures (the zone generator generates a diff-file with the changes made and the verification tools choose 20 records randomly)
** Query (with DO-bit set) for the predefined end-of-zone-record of the zone, check the results and validate the received signatures. 

Only if these checks succeed is the zone file propagated to the hidden masters – otherwise the rollout of this zone file is stopped and operations staff are notified. Consistency checks of the loaded zonefile are also performed on the hidden masters. Zone file access as required by ICANN is also provided. These procedures are the result of practical experience and knowledge gained from operating the “.at” TLD for over 15 years.

(iv) “Operation of the Registry Zone servers”: The TLD zone servers will consist of a mix of Anycast and Unicast servers in order to ensure high availability in accordance with ICANN SLA requirements and to achieve a high level of diversity in terms of software and IP connectivity. A stable high-performance DNS network with 100% availability is one of the major key components of a successful gTLD operation. As a result the DNS network is carefully designed to fulfil those requirements. Anycast-DNS with multiple geographic locations is utilized to minimize latency, distribute traffic and increase resilience against attacks. Unicast servers are used to increase diversity across the DNS network. The zone for the TLD will not contain any wildcards or other means to modify NXDOMAIN responses. More details about the DNS network structure is contained in response to Question 35.

(C), (v) “Dissemination of contact and other information concerning domain name registrations” (WHOIS service): A port-43 WHOIS (and a lightweight alternative) as well as a web-based WHOIS will be provided. In accordance with Specification 4 of the Registry Agreement, the WHOIS service is fully compliant with RFC 3912, and provides information about domain names, registrars and nameservers. Free public access to that information is granted. Web based access is also supported. The service is based on a scalable and redundant architecture to meet the required SLAs. To address privacy considerations, rate limiting on a per-IP-address basis is employed on the WHOIS interfaces. In addition to the WHOIS service, the Registry will also offer a “Domain Availability Service” using the “Finger” protocol as defined in RFC 1288. This service can be used by registrars to check whether a domain name is available or not but does not provide any other information. The implementation is fully RFC compliant. Since finger is a very simple protocol with a minimum of overhead, requests can be processed quickly by the registry systems, which saves on computing resources for both the registry and registrar. The Finger service is a read-only interface and does not pose any security risks for the registry. Instead, providing such an interface (which is functionally identical to the IRIS dchk) offloads pure “availability” checks from the more heavyweight WHOIS and EPP interfaces which helps to improve the overall performance of those services.
(D) “Internationalized Domain Names”: The registry will offer IDNs as detailed in the response to Question 44. IDN support in the proposed registry will strictly adhere to all relevant standards. Only labels with explicitly permitted code points will be allowed. The registry will be conservative in allowing additional code points and will only allow code points that do not carry risks such as user confusion or technical issues caused by lack of client support etc.

(E) “DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)”: The registry will perform zone signing activities in accordance with ICANN requirements and industry best practice. The respective Delegation Signer (DS) Records will in full compliance with established procedures be sent to IANA for inclusion in the root zone to establish a chain of Trust. The EPP interface of the Registry will also accept key material to extend that chain of trust down to individual domain name registrations. Further information about DNSSEC procedures is contained in response to question 43.

Regarding ICANN’s “Consensus Policies”, the Registry will provide the necessary services to comply with these policies (as well as any Temporary Policies as adopted by ICANN). This includes support for ICANN’s UDPR and URS processes. The Registry Operator will also restrict Registrar use of the “Add Grace Period” (AGP) as required by the “Add Grace Period Limits Policy”.

The registry system (software, documentation, test infrastructure) providing the above mentioned Registry Services is readily available at the time of this writing and most of the components are in production use by one or more TLDs.

All registry services are based on well-known industry standards and implement RFCs developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force. 

The Registry will not operate any services that are specific or unique to the particular TLD. Hence, it is expected that potential registrars will require only minimal effort to connect to the Registry Systems to be able to perform registrations of domain names under the TLD.

Registrar Web: Registrars will be provided with a “Registrar Web”, a web site specifically targeted at registrars that will support registration procedures and allow registrars to change the configuration of their Registry account. This will include administration of their EPP login (particularly their client IP addresses) details, invoice downloads and financial functions such as topping up prepaid credit with the registry. Terms and conditions as well as registry policies are also available for download. Moreover the registrar web page provides statistics to registrars, gives them an overview of transactions requiring payment and shows available credit. 

Registrar Helpdesk

A helpdesk will also be provided for registrars. This helpdesk will handle technical, legal and administrative inquiries from registrars. Helpdesk agents can be reached via email, telephone and fax. A professional ticketing system and qualified agents will ensure that all queries are handled within an appropriate turnaround time. Helpdesk services will be available during working hours on business days and an additional emergency contact will be available 24⁄7. 

Security

The Registry Operator takes significant measures against (1) the unauthorized disclosure, alteration, insertion or destruction of Registry data and (2) the unauthorized access to or disclosure of information or resources on the internet. This includes a detailed security policy (contained in answer to Question 30), a secure architecture (see response to Question 32), a multi-layered backup strategy (details in response to Question 37) and a domain name lifecycle that makes it extremely unlikely that third parties can gain control over the registration record of a domain (see response to Question 27).

Stability

The operation of the TLD and the Registry Services offered do not involve any technology or business practice that has the potential to adversely affect the stability of the TLD’s services and⁄or the DNS as a whole. All protocols used are based on authoritative standards published by well-established and recognized standards organizations. For example, the DNS service provided for the TLD is in strict compliance with the relevant RFCs created by the Internet Engineering Task Force and as a result will be fully compatible with existing and deployed internet technology. Specifically, the TLD will not engage in any DNS “tricks” such as wildcard or NXDOMAIN redirection and will ensure that no conditions affecting the throughput, response time, consistency or coherence of responses to Internet servers or end systems arise.

In order to fulfill the functions described above, the Registry Backend Operator also performs operations of standard business components, such as:

Permanent office location infrastructure in two cities (Vienna and Salzburg), including three meeting rooms, with additional emergency office space contracted.
Rented datacenter space at various locations.

Billing and Financial administration and infrastructure

Technical office infrastructure such as IT systems (file storage, email⁄fax systems, document management), call-center enabled PBXes with integrated mobile devices, Teleconferencing equipment, fail-safe networking infrastructure between office locations themselves, and between office and datacenter locations.

These basic “business building blocks” are established since nearly 15 years, and are used for the day to day operations of the registry backend operations. Since some of the the elements listed above are assumed to be standard business commodities that are not specific to the operations of a gTLD registry, they are not described in further detail in subsequent answers (eg. enterprise PBX). 

A number of the Registry Back-end Operator’s staff are actively engaged in numerous working groups within the Internet Engineering Task Force, particularly those focused on DNS, ENUM, emergency services and geographic location. In addition several of these employees are authors of published and draft IETF RFCs.

High-level SRS systems description:

The Shared Registry System is based on the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) and employs a multi-tiered architecture with public facing interfaces completely segregated from backend functions (such as database and management interfaces). An overview of the functionality provided by the SRS is as follows:

Registrars connect to and authenticate against the EPP frontend systems.
Those frontends receive and parse all EPP commands to perform checks of business logic (including any policy requirements) and subsequently perform (or reject) the requested action against the back-end data storage.
The back-end data storage is handled by a Relational Database Management System (described in detail in response to Question 33).

The server elements used for the SRS employ a number of technologies to ensure service availability and reliability. These include the use of multiple, virtualised Linux servers and several layers of high-availability functionality such as active-active load balancing, standby components and replication of full virtual machine images. A significant amount of design and implementation effort has focussed on removing any potential single point of failure in the SRS architecture. This architecture has also been fully tested and verified on a functionally identical prototype system, and is operational for the “.bh” migration. Some of that work included training and verification by independent third party system architecture experts, in particular the critical system availability functions such as cluster failover and real-time block device level replication.

The SRS software itself is readily available at the time of this submission. It is implemented and operated in accordance with the requirements of Specification 6 („Registry Interoperability and Continuity Specifications“) and the respective SLAs in Specification 10. The SRS uses EPP as its core provisioning protocol and supports, amongst other RFCs, the following provisioning RFCs as required in Section 1.2 of Specification 6:

RFC 5730 (EPP Base Specification)
RFC 5731 (EPP Domain Name Mapping)
RFC 5732 (EPP Host Mapping)
RFC 5733 (EPP Contact Mapping)
RFC 5734 (EPP TCP Transport). 
RFC 3735 (EPP Extension Guidelines)
RFC 5910 (DNSSEC Mapping)
RFC 3915 (Grace Period Mapping)

For maximum interoperability, only EPP functionality that is documented in the above RFCs is implemented – i.e. there are no proprietary EPP extensions used in the SRS. Further details about the implementation of the EPP Registry Services are contained in response to Question 25 (“EPP”).

It is understood that SRS availability and 100% data integrity are absolute key requirements for the deployment of a successful TLD operation. As a result the SRS implementation was developed with a strong focus on those key factors.

The core software platform employed by the SRS, with its powerful modular policy functionality has been in production use for the „.at“ ccTLD (nic.at) since 2003, additionally the „.no“ ccTLD (norid) successfully migrated to the registry software over the course of 2010. Another installation of the software was recently rolled out to support the migration of the “.bh” ccTLD (Kingdom of Bahrain) from the incumbent operator to the Regulatory Authority of Bahrain. Furthermore, this core software is currently being used to provide SRS implementations for ENUM (Electronic Numbering) Registries in Austria (+43) and Ireland (+353). Finally, test instances of this customised software for ENUM are deployed in The Netherlands and Australia. 

The modular and highly extensible structure of the SRS software allows for customized per-TLD policies that are implemented on top of an identical core registry system. This allows for code reuse between different TLD implementations, regardless of the policy framework required.

The implementation of this software, specifically for this new gTLD, has been customized to the needs of the registry operator and to meet or exceed ICANN’s policy and SLA requirements set out in the Applicant Guidebook for new gTLDs. A detailed description of the architecture supporting the SRS software is contained in answer to Question 32 (Architecture). 

Details for the DNS elements of the TLD service, including zone file creation, signing, dissemination and testing procedures are contained in answers to Question 35 (DNS) and answers to Question 43 (DNSSEC). 

Policy and additional documentation about Internationalized Domain Name (IDN) usage in the TLD is contained in answer to Question 44 (IDN). 

The SRS is fully IPv6 compliant: It accepts IPv6 addresses as Glue Records for host objects and is reachable via native IPv6 transport. Additional details about IPv6 support are contained in answer to Question 36 (IPv6). 

For reference, the Performance Specifications relevant to the SRS as required by Specification 10 (Registry Performance Specifications) are included in Table Q24-01. As indicated, the SRS performance meets or exceeds all SLA requirements and significant effort has been taken to verify these SLA requirements on a physical installation of the SRS architecture⁄software. Hence, the performance metrics included in Table Q24-01 are real measurements, rather than theoretical assumptions or estimations.

Note: The performance SLAs have been verified by setting up a prototype system that is functionally and architecturally identical to the registry system, but has limited hardware resources compared to the proposed production architecture. Hence, the performance of the actual production system is expected to exceed the measured performance values on the prototype system indicated in Table Q24-01. Details on the measurements are contained in the responses to Question 33.

Table Q24-01: see attachment

The measurements used to achieve the individual Service Levels are discussed in the following sections:

Performance – Shared Registry Service (EPP)

EPP service availability

The EPP interface of the SRS is provided by two front end server processes on two physically separate machines. Both front ends are accessible via a single IP address, and the load is dynamically shared between these two frontends. In the case that a single frontend system is unresponsive, it is automatically removed from the load balanced group. When a frontend returns to service, it is automatically added back into the load balanced group configuration. In addition, alerts to the NOC are triggered for all such events so that the operations team is notified of error conditions immediately.

For security reasons, access to all EPP interfaces is restricted and is only permitted from network ranges of authorized registrars. 

Using this architecture, the SRS for the proposed TLD will exceed ICANN’s „EPP service availability“ requirement of 98%. A production implementation of the Registry System (for the “.at” TLD) with similar software & architecture has surpassed 99.6% monthly availability for each month during 2009, 2010 and 2011 (with most months above 99.9% availability). 

EPP command performance notes

The performance of the SRS for EPP session, query and transform commands was extensively evaluated. Please refer to the response to question 33 for the measurements and figures indicating the performance under a realistic base load of the proposed registry system. These figures show that the EPP session, query and transform command RTTs clearly meet the 2000ms and 4000ms thresholds, respectively, for at least 90% of the commands.

Additional Performance figures

The response to Question 33 (Database) contains some additional performance figures for the SRS, again gathered on a prototype system.

Network Overview & Number of Servers

The SRS servers make use of the two data center locations “Vienna” and “Salzburg”, (distance approximately 300km⁄185miles). The data centers are equipped with multiple, independent upstream connections to the internet (from different service providers) and two Layer 2 crosslinks. The backend registry operator also operates a Local Internet Registry (LIR), allocates IP space from its own address pool, and operates its own Autonomous Systems (ASes). The high-level network structure is shown in Figure Q24-02, it is further detailed in Figures Q32-07 and Q32-08 as part of the answer to Question 32.


As shown, a significant focus of the network design work has been to remove any single point of failure. Also, each server is connected to two access routers, so that an outage of any single network component does not affect server and consequently service availability. More information about the network infrastructure at each individual location is contained in response to Question 35. A complete and detailed overview of machinery in place for this TLD is given in Table Q32-11 of the answer to Question 32.

The server infrastructure of the gTLD’s SRS consists of the following set of machines (this list does not include the actual DNS network):

Two physically separate, dedicated servers running SRS frontend instances and the production database, clustered in active-active (Frontends) and active-standby (Database) configuration. Database as well as SRS frontends are segregated from each other via virtualization. In terms of scalability, should the TLD exceed 500,000 registered domains, provisions are in place to add further, dedicated machines as needed.

A total of 6 physical machines provide the additional functions of the gTLD, including zone generation, DNSSEC signing, zone deployment (via Hidden Masters), backup, management, and a test instance of the SRS. The functions on those 6 “infrastructure” machines are shared among up to 4 gTLD installations, and adding more machines is planned depending on growth projections for each individual TLD. The existing infrastructure scales to at least 500,000 domain names per TLD without requiring additional servers. Services on those physical servers are again segregated from each other using virtualization.

Additionally, several other servers are involved in supplementary functionality, such as monitoring, tape backup, logging & reporting services.

All servers used for the operation of the TLD are (and will be) rack mountable, data center grade machines with active maintenance contracts from the supplier.

Interconnectivity with other Registry Services

The SRS, as well as the infrastructure required to perform the other critical Registry Services are installed on servers located in the same data center (under emergency conditions, services may be moved to servers in the backup data center). Therefore, the services are inter-connected using either Local Area Networking (LAN) or redundant private layer 2 links (linking the “Vienna” and “Salzburg” locations). In addition to the redundant layer 2 links, infrastructure is in place to securely tunnel traffic between those two locations over the public internet in the unlikely case that both the private site cross-links fail. From a security perspective, multiple firewall layers are used to filter network traffic between the various network segments, i.e. between the public Internet, perimeter and internal networks.

Zone dissemination or transfer from the hidden primary to the public nameserver network is performed over the public internet however all such communications are cryptographically secured. Both locations have redundant upstream connectivity from independent providers with a minimum total bandwidth of 2x1 Gbit⁄s.

Both networks are also connected to the “Vienna Internet Exchange” (VIX), where peering relationships with many other organizations have been established. This provides an optimal routing path to the Registry Systems and services for those organisations.

In terms of data integrity and consistency the following provisions have been put in place to ensure correct synchronization of Registry systems:

The active and standby database servers are synced in real-time using block device level replication functionality provided by the DRBD technology.
DNS zone servers are synchronized every 15 minutes.
For failover purposes, full machine images or snapshots of all virtual machines are copied to the standby data center once per day (please see the response to Question 37 for details)
Synchronization between SRS and registry helpdesk systems occurs every few minutes.
It is important to note that as WHOIS data is provided directly from the backend registry database there is no need to synchronize WHOIS data.

The synchronization strategy used differs from service to service. For the SRS frontends themselves, an active-active setup with OSPF-based load-balancing is employed. The registry database uses an active-standby setup with real-time synchronization and automatic failover. 

Resourcing Plan

It should be noted that the architecture and basic development work for the SRS software has already been completed at the time of this submission (except policy adjustments for the TLD), which reduces the time and number of personnel required to perform the necessary development and maintenance work.

The Registry Backend Operator employs 4 developers (totalling to 3 FTEs) responsible for developing and maintaining the SRS software, for example implementing per-TLD policy customisations. Those developers also work on the development and maintenance of RDDS, and their work is shared amongst the operation of multiple TLDs.

Additionally, 2 system engineers (2 FTEs) are responsible for performing the actual deployment of the SRS for a new TLD including the subsequent hand over of the newly installed systems to the Network Operations team.

A minimum of 8 people are fully trained to perform day-to-day and ongoing maintenance operations of the SRS systems and software.

The required hardware for the SRS is described above and all related costs are bundled with the “Software as a Service” fees that the Registry Operator pays to the Registry Backend Operator. This also includes all resources that are required to operate the hardware for the SRS, such as data center or other infrastructure expenses, maintenance contracts and hardware replacement.

1 Overview 

The SRS of this proposed gTLD will use EPP for communication with registrars. The EPP interface is and in full compliance with the following RFCs and, where possible, entirely based on common standards: 

• RFC 5730 - Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
• RFC 5731 - Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping
• RFC 5732 - Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Host Mapping
• RFC 5733 - Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Contact Mapping
• RFC 5734 - Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Transport over TCP
• RFC 5910 - Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) 
• RFC 3915 - Domain Registry Grace Period Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
• RFC 3735 - Guidelines for Extending the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) 

Note that the objective is to base the EPP interface entirely on published RFCs and it is hence not planned to use any proprietary EPP commands. However, it is understood that some functionality required by ICANN cannot be implemented by means of EPP extensions specified in published RFCs. This includes support for:

• Trademark Clearing House: integration in the domain registration process (sunrise and claiming phase)
• IDN: exposure of language tags in the EPP interface
• IDN: selection of variants to be included in the DNS zone

Currently the following documents related to the topics listed above are available:

• draft-tan-epp-launchphase
• draft-obispo-epp-idn
• draft-kong-epp-variants-mapping

The registry backend operator participates in the standardization process and understands that the community is currently working on the respective documents. It is expected that specifications are published and implementable before the registry goes operational, which allows the registry operator to stick to its strategy of using only IETF RFC specified EPP extensions. 

However, if such specifications are not available in a timely manner before the registry intends to go operational, draft specifications that reflect industry and community consensus will be considered instead in order to cover ICANNs functional requirements. 

Via EPP, the following objects can be managed by registrars:

* domain objects
* host objects
* contact objects

The following commands are supported by the EPP interface:

* Session Management
** Login
** Logout
** Poll
** Hello
* Domain Commands
** Check domain
** Info domain
** Create domain
** Delete domain
** Renew domain
** Transfer domain
** Update domain (including “restore”)
* Host commands
** Check host
** Info host
** Create host
** Delete host
** Update host
* Contact commands
** Check contact
** Info contact
** Create contact
** Delete contact
** Update contact

According to the definitions in RFC 5730, the registry operator will apply for an EPP repository identifier with the IANA registry (http:⁄⁄www.iana.org⁄assignments⁄epp-repository-ids) as follows:

ID: wien, #x0077 #x0069 #x0065 #x006e
Registrant Contact: punkt.wien GmbH 〈registry@nic.wien〉

The only language supported for message elements in EPP is English. 

2 Session Management

The transport layer between EPP clients and the SRS EPP interface is protected using TLS with X.509 certificates. The registry will only use strong ciphers such as those required by the EPP RFC and listed below, but reserves the right to modify the list of ciphers depending on cryptographic developments.

• TLS 1.0 [RFC2246]: TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS 1.1 [RFC4346]: TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA

On top of the TLS based identity verification, login to the SRS’s EPP interface is protected using two additional authentication factors, with one factor being the IP address of the client and the other factor being the clients’ credentials. Failed login attempts are logged and reported. The administration of authorised IP address ranges can be performed by registrars via the Registrar’s web interface or by contacting the helpdesk. Passwords can be changed via the EPP login command as described in RFC 5730, Section 2.9.1.1.

EPP sessions will be terminated by the server either after an idle timeout of 20 minutes or after the maximum session length of 24 hours. The registry operator reserves the right to restrict the number of concurrent EPP sessions per registrar (a limit of three sessions is currently defined but this may be amended depending on registry and TLD scaling requirements). 

The EPP service also employs infrastructure elements and software measures to perform rate-limiting of EPP sessions (such measures may, for example, be required during landrush phases).

The SRS does not support EPP command pipelining. 

3 Object Management

The registry supports the provisioning of contact, host and domain objects as defined in the respective RFCs and according to the lifecycle described in response to question 27.

Registration periods apply for domain objects only (in one year increments). The default initial registration and renewal period is 1 year. The client may choose another period of up to 10 years when issuing the respective request (total registration period of a domain must never exceed 10 years).

Since the registry uses grace periods, the grace period mapping of RFC 3915 is supported by the EPP interface. In particular, a restore command is issued as an extension to the update command, as described in this RFC. Furthermore, the restore report is also delivered to the registry via EPP.

The registry operator reserves the right to perform a garbage collection process on unlinked contact and unlinked external host objects. Internal hosts follow the lifecycle of their superordinate domain and are not subject to garbage collection (for details refer to responses to question 27, 28).

For contact objects, only internationalized postalInfo elements are supported. All child elements as listed in the RFC are supported. Note that since the registry does not support contact transfers, contact authInfo is not used. 

For the provisioning of DNSSEC trust chains, the EPP interface supports the extension described in RFC 5910 for accepting DS data (key data interface is not supported). Details on DNSSEC support are contained in response to question 43.

4 Domain Transfer

The domain transfer command has several subcommands. Note that a transfer can only be requested on domain objects but that the registry system will automatically transfer subordinate host objects when the superordinate domain is transferred. Contact objects are never transferred.

The set of transfer commands consists of the following subcommands: “request”, “approve”, “reject”, “cancel” and “query”. To request a domain transfer, the requestor sends a transfer request with a valid authInfo. The losing registrar is subsequently notified and can either reject or approve this request. In the event that the losing registrar doesn’t explicitly reject or approve the request, the registry will auto-approve the request after 5 calendar days. Before the transfer is approved, auto-approved or rejected, (i.e., the domain is in pendingTransfer state) the requestor may cancel it. A detailed description of the domain transfer lifecycle is contained in response to question 27 (Figure Q27-02).

AuthInfo is required for all domain objects. This information is necessary in order to authenticate a domain transfer process. The registry system requires that the authInfo is at least 8 characters long with a maximum length of 32 characters. Furthermore, at least one alphanumeric character (‘A’ to ‘Z’; both lower and uppercase letters), and at least either one numeric character (‘0’ – ‘9’) or one special character are required for each authInfo.

5 Status values

The domain object supports the following status values (as described in Section 5 of RFC 5731):

• inactive (to indicate that no hosts are associated with the object). This status value is set automatically by the server.
• ok (default status) set automatically by the server. This status value is never combined with any other status values.
• pendingTransfer is set by the server when the domain name is subject to a pending transfer
• pendingDelete is set by the server when the domain name is subject to deletion. Note that the registry also supports the RGP grace periods - redemption and pending delete as listed below.
• serverHold⁄clientHold set when the domain object should not appear in the zone.
• serverUpdateProhibited⁄clientUpdateProhibited set when the domain name cannot be updated due to server or client policy.
• serverTransferProhibited⁄clientTransferProhibited set when the domain name cannot be transferred due to server or client policy.
• serverDeleteProhibited⁄clientDeleteProhibited set when the domain name cannot be deleted due to server policy or client provisions.
• serverRenewProhibited⁄clientRenewProhibited set when the domain name is not eligible for renewal.

Each domain object will always have at least one associated status value.
Additionally, domain objects support the following status values related to the grace period mapping as per RFC 3915, Section 3.1:

• addPeriod
• autoRenewPeriod
• renewPeriod
• transferPeriod
• redemptionPeriod
• pendingRestore
• pendingDelete

The contact object supports the following status values (as described in Section 2.2 of RFC 5733):

• linked (when the object is used in at least one domain name object)
• ok (default status)
• serverUpdateProhibited⁄clientUpdateProhibited (for server or client policy reasons, modifications to the object are not allowed)
• serverDeleteProhibited⁄clientDeleteProhibited (for server or client policy reasons removal of the object from the registry is not allowed)

Each contact object will always have at least one associated status value.

The host object supports the following status values (as described in Section 2.3 of RFC 5732):

• linked: Set by the registry when a host is referenced by at least one domain
• ok (default status)
• pendingTransfer: Set on internal host objects when the superordinate domain is pending transfer.
• serverDeleteProhibited⁄clientDeleteProhibited (for server or client policy reasons removal of the object from the registry is not allowed)
• serverUpdateProhibited⁄clientUpdateProhibited (for server or client policy reasons, modifications to the object are not allowed)

Each host object will always have at least one associated status value.

6 EPP Server Implementation

The EPP server implementation is based on the Apache HTTP server, with the HTTP protocol handler replaced with a custom, Perl-based EPP handler. This allows for the reuse of Apache’s session management, logging and resource allocation functionality. EPP systems based on this software have been deployed in production since 2004. The software has been continuously developed, in order to accommodate policy changes and scalability requirements.

The EPP software variant for the proposed TLD is already available and has already been deployed on prototype systems (with the exception of functionality where specifications are unclear at the time of this writing, i.e. Trademark Clearing House integration).

Since no proprietary extensions are planned, no EPP templates and no EPP extension schemas are provided in response to this question. Schemas and examples of the commands supported are included in the respective RFCs.

7 Resource Planning

The technical resources required for the operation of the EPP server (as part of the SRS) are described in response to questions 32 and 24. For EPP development and evaluation of related issues, the Registry Back-End Operator has a highly skilled research & development team of 5 persons, of which 3 people are intimately familiar with the details of the EPP protocol. They also monitor and contribute to the discussions within the IETF regarding future developments of EPP (“provreg” mailing list). 

All technical staff are trained on the day-to-day operations of the EPP service. The helpdesk team is trained and experienced in troubleshooting EPP support problems with Registrars, and can escalate to the EPP experts or even core developers in case of more complex problems.

Overview

As detailed in Specification 4 “Specification for Registration Data Publication Services” (RDPS), the Registry Operator will operate a fully compliant “Registration Data Directory Service” (RDDS), will provide “Zone File Access” as required and will grant ICANN the required “Bulk Registration Data Access”. These services will fulfil the requirements stated in the respective specification, and will also meet or exceed the respective RDDS SLAs as required in Specification 10.

In addition to the requisite WHOIS service, a lightweight variant of the RDDS, a so-called “Domain Availability Interface”, based on the “finger” protocol, will be provided. This service will supplement the WHOIS service, and exposes a very limited subset of the information already available via the RDDS, namely, whether or not a certain domain name is available for registration.

Registration Data Directory Services

A WHOIS service will be available via port 43 in compliance with RFC 3912. Additionally a web-based directory service, to be made available at “whois.nic.wien will provide a free, publicly accessible, query-based interface which will provide information regarding “Domain Name”, “Registrar” and “Nameserver” objects. The data format used for those objects is specified below. It is understood that ICANN reserves the right to require alternative formats and protocols, and upon such specification, such changes will be implemented as soon as reasonably practicable.

Specifically, the WHOIS service fulfils the following requirements:

The server is fully compliant with RFC 3912
Free public query-based access is provided
The services runs on “whois.nic.wien” on TCP port 43
Data objects represented by key⁄value pairs, with multiple key⁄value pairs with the same key in case of fields with more than one value
Additionally, web-based access on “whois.nic.wien is provided
In order to prevent abuse, highly configurable volume access limitations are deployed
The architecture is robust, implements a number of failsafe mechanisms and is in compliance with the RDDS SLA’s outlined in Specification 10.

Architecture

The technical architecture of the WHOIS system (servers, switches, routers, etc.) is depicted in Figure Q26-02, and employs the following components:

Connectivity to the internet is handled via the two redundant access routers of the registry system. Each server is connected to each of the two routers, with one connection serving as an active path, and the second path (to the other router) serving as a failover path in case of failure of the first.
Two virtual machines on physically separate hardware run the frontend Whois⁄Finger⁄HTTP daemons.
The WHOIS service on each server operates as part of an active-active cluster. Both servers announce their respective service addresses to the routers via OSPF with the routers distributing traffic between the two frontends by means of OSPF load sharing logic. 
Both active instances are connected to the active registry database using persistent database connections to reduce session handling overhead. The frontend servers switch automatically to the registry standby database in the event of a database failover.
In the case where one of the frontend servers fails, the OSPF announcement for that server automatically ceases and traffic is redirected to the remaining active node within a few seconds.
Access is restricted to TCP port 43 (for Whois), TCP port 79 (for Finger) and TCP port 80 (HTTP) using firewall access lists on the routers.
The codebase for the WHOIS and Finger servers was developed in-house using the “C” programming language and is based on state-of-the art design concepts to ensure a robust and stable operation. This software has been actively developed for a number of years and is currently in production at the “.at” and “.no” TLD registries.
The software is also highly configurable, allowing query limits to be set based on source IP address⁄blocks for both IPv6 and IPv4 addressing formats. It also allows for fine grained control of specific rate-limits on a per network block basis.
The software actively generates access and service statistics for monitoring and management purposes.
The RDDS uses the “live” registry database and as a result updates to the registry database are reflected in real-time to the WHOIS server. However, in the event that the WHOIS load starts to impact the performance of the Registry database, provisions are in place to move the WHOIS server to an alternate read-only replica of the “live” database if necessary.

Access Limitations and Access Restrictions

Access control lists (ACLs) protect the RDDS service hosts against unwanted access but grant public access to the defined services (WHOIS, finger, HTTP). 

In addition to this general protection of the service infrastructure, the RDDS must also make provision to address the following scenarios:

Bulk requests from public unknown sources (e.g. to grab data)
High speed ⁄ high volume requests from known source addresses (e.g. from registrars)

In order to handle the above scenarios the WHOIS software supports the following configurable service policies:

The number of allowed requests (within a specific time frame) on a per IP address (or per IP subnet) basis, for either IPv4 or IPv6 and with support for a “most specific” matching rule of those entries. This provides the ability to set different limitations for different user groups ⁄ network ranges. Violations of those limits are included in the daily WHOIS service reports sent to the operations team.

WHOIS Input Format

The data format complies with the requirements of Specification 4 of the “new gTLD agreement”. The definitions below apply to the command line WHOIS interface (port 43) as well as the web interface:

Queries can be issued for domain name, registrar and nameserver objects
Queries that include the argument “registrar” trigger a search for registrar data objects. If the argument is “nameserver”, a search for nameserver objects is actioned, while queries without any such prefix trigger a search for a domain or nameserver.
Wildcard searches and substring searches are not supported.
Using the option “-C” (“charset”) as part of the command line WHOIS query specifies a character encoding for the protocol. This setting applies to the both the input and output character encoding, and supports the following values: “US-ASCII”, “ISO-8859-1” and “UTF-8”. The default character set is “UTF-8”. On the web interface the character encoding will always be set to UTF-8 with modification of this option not available.
In the case of IDNs, the search string must be in the A-Label format of the domain or nameserver. Searches based on the U-Label format are not supported.

Example queries (including the command line “whois” client itself):

Domain name data: whois -h whois.nic.wien example.wien
Domain name data (with character set parameter): whois -h whois.nic.wien -- -C us-ascii example.wien
Registrar data: whois -h whois.nic.wien “registrar Example Company”
Nameserver data by name: whois -h whois.nic.wien ns1.example.wien
Nameserver data by IP address: whois -h whois.nic.wien “nameserver 10.0.0.10”

Note: In the case where a host is registered for the origin of a delegated domain, i.e. both domain “example.wien” and nameserver “example.wien” exist, the query will match and return both the domain name and nameserver data objects.

WHOIS Output Format

The output format of the WHOIS server follows that outlined in Specification 4 of the “new gTLD agreement”: 

Domain Name Data: 

Domain ID: D1234567-TLD 
Domain Name: EXAMPLE.wien 
Updated Date: 2009-05-29T20:13:00Z 
Creation Date: 2000-10-08T00:45:00Z 
Registry Expiry Date: 2010-10-08T00:44:59Z 
Sponsoring Registrar: EXAMPLE REGISTRAR LLC 
Sponsoring Registrar IANA ID: 5555555 
Domain Status: clientDeleteProhibited 
Domain Status: clientRenewProhibited 
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited 
Domain Status: serverUpdateProhibited 
Registrant ID: 5372808-GTLD 
Registrant Name: EXAMPLE REGISTRANT 
Registrant Organization: EXAMPLE ORGANIZATION 
Registrant Street: 123 EXAMPLE STREET 
Registrant City: ANYTOWN 
Registrant State⁄Province: AP 
Registrant Postal Code: A1A1A1 
Registrant Country: EX
Registrant Phone: +1.5555551212 
Registrant Phone Ext: 1234 
Registrant Fax: +1.5555551213 
Registrant Fax Ext: 4321 
Registrant Email: EMAIL@EXAMPLE.wien 
Admin ID: 5372809-GTLD 
Admin Name: EXAMPLE REGISTRANT ADMINISTRATIVE 
Admin Organization: EXAMPLE REGISTRANT ORGANIZATION 
Admin Street: 123 EXAMPLE STREET 
Admin City: ANYTOWN 
Admin State⁄Province: AP 
Admin Postal Code: A1A1A1 
Admin Country: EX 
Admin Phone: +1.5555551212 
Admin Phone Ext: 1234 
Admin Fax: +1.5555551213 
Admin Fax Ext: 
Admin Email: EMAIL@EXAMPLE.wien 
Tech ID: 5372811-GTLD 
Tech Name: EXAMPLE REGISTRAR TECHNICAL 
Tech Organization: EXAMPLE REGISTRAR LLC 
Tech Street: 123 EXAMPLE STREET 
Tech City: ANYTOWN 
Tech State⁄Province: AP 
Tech Postal Code: A1A1A1 
Tech Country: EX 
Tech Phone: +1.1235551234 
Tech Phone Ext: 1234 
Tech Fax: +1.5555551213 
Tech Fax Ext: 93 
Tech Email: EMAIL@EXAMPLE.wien 
Name Server: NS01.EXAMPLEREGISTRAR.wien 
Name Server: NS02.EXAMPLEREGISTRAR.wien 
DNSSEC: Signed
DS Key Tag 1: 54135
Algorithm 1: 5
Digest Type 1: 1
Digest 1: 〈DIGEST〉
DS Key Tag 2: 54135
Algorithm 2: 5
Digest Type 2: 2
Digest 2: 〈DIGEST〉

% Copyright (c) 20XX by NIC.wien 
% Restricted rights.
% Response generated on: 2011-10-13 11:11:25 UTC

Note that the “Domain Name” field will always contain the A-Label format of the domain. In cases where an IDN response is returned (and an appropriate character encoding was requested), the response will contain an additional field, the so-called “Domain U-Label”, containing the U-Label format of the respective Domain, for example:

Domain U-Label: example.wien

In the case where data for an unsigned domain is returned, the “DNSSEC” field will contain the value “unsigned” and the other DNSSEC-related fields will be excluded from the response.

Registrar Data: 

Registrar Name: Example Registrar, Inc. 
Street: 1234 Admiralty Way 
City: Marina del Rey 
State⁄Province: CA 
Postal Code: 90292 
Country: US 
Phone Number: +1.3105551212 
Fax Number: +1.3105551213
Email: registrar@example.wien 
Registrar IANA ID: 55566677

% Copyright (c) 20XX by NIC.wien 
% Restricted rights.
% Response generated on: 2011-10-13 11:11:25 UTC

Nameserver Data:

Server Name: NS1.EXAMPLE.wien
IP Address: 192.0.2.123 
IP Address: 2001:0DB8::1
Registrar: Example Registrar, Inc.
Registrar IANA ID: 55566677

% Copyright (c) 20XX by NIC.wien
% Restricted rights.
% Response generated on: 2011-10-13 11:11:25 UTC

Web-based RDDS

In addition to the command line based WHOIS service described above, the Registry Operator will, in line with requirements, provide a web-based WHOIS interface. The web-based interface supports the following classes of users in accordance with stated policies:

The general public (“anonymous access”):
Anonymous users can retrieve a limited amount of responses from the web based interface. To avoid unwanted bulk access and to prevent users from data harvesting the following access restrictions are deployed:
Client limits per day to be set based on source IPv4 and IPv6 addresses or blocks.
CAPTCHAs as a challenge-response test to ensure that the response is generated by a human being.
Registrars and other authenticated users:
Registrars and other approved users are issued with an authentication token that allows them to retrieve a greater number of WHOIS records via the web interface. Users qualifying in principal could for example include ICANN staff, URS or UDRP providers, and will be approved case by case by the registry.

All transactions on the web-based WHOIS are also logged and daily usage reports are sent to operations staff. The web-based WHOIS supports the same object types and query formats as the command line interface above, with the exception of the „-C“ (character set) switch. The contents of a response from the web-based WHOIS service are also identical to the command line service, but may be reformatted and styled using HTML⁄CSS to aid presentation and display.

Searchable WHOIS

Searchable WHOIS functionality is not provided. This is to prevent bulk data harvesting and further data merging using extensive request combinations and Boolean search techniques. This is done intentionally to comply with data protection laws and privacy obligations.

Any request from legal institutions and law enforcement agencies for information outside of that supplied by any of the WHOIS services is dealt with directly by the legal department of the registry.

As a result there is no future intention to offer a broad search functionality, this applies to both the WHOIS protocol interface (port 43) and the web-based WHOIS interface

Lightweight RDDS Access (“Finger”)

In addition to the required WHOIS interface a lightweight domain availability interface is supported. This interface is based on the “Finger” protocol, specified in RFC 1288, and exposes a very limited subset of data (already available in WHOIS), namely whether or not a certain domain name is available for registration. It provides faster response times than the standard WHOIS interface and places less load on the registry systems. The service will be operated accordingly:

Lightweight access based on the “finger” protocol according to RFC 1288
Lightweight access runs on finger.nic.wien on port 79
No exposure of any information additional to that already available via the WHOIS RDDS
Query format (command line example): “finger example.wien@finger.nic.wien”
Response format (example): “example.wien IS NOT available”

IPv6 Support

All RDDS services (WHOIS, web-based WHOIS, Finger and bulk data access) fully support IPv6. In summary there is no difference in service quality levels or service responses between IPv4 and IPv6 for these services.

A detailed description of IPv6 support can be found in response to Question 36.

Service Level Compliance

The RDDS service complies with the SLA requirements (as defined in Specification 10) as follows:
Table Q26-01: please see attachment

RDDS Availability

The redundant and resilient architecture of the WHOIS system is described above, and is served by architecture as outlined in response to question 32. It is designed, at a minimum, to meet the required availability levels of 98%. It is understood that a reliable RDDS system is vitally important for TLD operations.

RDDS query RTT

The internal response time of the WHOIS system is significantly below the RDDS query RTT limit of 2000 ms so that it can be expected that for 95% of the queries this SLA requirement will be met. On test installations of the service, the query RTT is less than 500 ms, even in the event of a significant number of concurrent connections.

RDDS update time

Since the WHOIS system queries the “live” registry database, there is no update delay and hence the RDDS update time of 60 minutes for 95% of the updates can be assured. 

Zone File Access

In accordance with Section 2 of Specification 4 of the Agreement („Zone File Access“), the Registry Operator will enter into an agreement with any internet user to provide access to download the zone file data and will cooperate as required with Centralized Zone Data Access (CZDA) Providers. This will be facilitated as follows:

A dedicated FTP server will be set up for access to the zone file data. The name of that server will be: wien.zda.icann.org (pending allocation of that hostname by ICANN zone administrators). The zone file and associated checksum files will be available for download for the previous 3 days. Files will be generated once a day and named according to Section 2.1.3 of the Agreement.

The file format follows exactly the specification which is based on the Master Zone File format defined in RFC 1035, according to Section 2.1.4 of the agreement.

A specific user ID and password has to be assigned for each user to restrict access to accredited users and to prevent unauthorized access. This user has to access the server with this specific user ID to be able to transfer data.

Access will be free of charge but limited to one download per day.

All logins and data transfers are logged, monitored and reported. Access statistics will be available to the registry operator as well as to others if required.

The Registry Operator will also cooperate with ICANN and CZDA Providers as required in Section 2.2 of the agreement. Additional access is granted to ICANN itself (or its designee) and any designated Emergency Operator if required.

Bulk Registration Data Access

As an operator of a Thick Registry, the Registry Operator will operate in compliance with Section 3.2 of Specification 4 of the „new gTLD Agreement“ („Exceptional Access to Thick Registration Data“) as well as in compliance with Section 3.1 of Specification 4 („Periodic Access to Thin Registration Data“), and will provide ICANN with the required data in the required format. 

The data will be provided in conformance with Specification 2 („Escrow“) of the Agreement, as required.

Resources

Regarding development of the RDDS interfaces, it shall be noted that most of the work is already complete at the time of this writing (eg. WHOIS and finger daemon are fully deployed and operational for other TLDs). Therefore, only minimal development work is required, and hence within TLD-Box’s (the Registry Back-End Operator of the proposed gTLD) development team, only a half FTE is necessary (and planned for) for the continuous adaption and maintenance of the RDDS software itself.

For the actual operation of the RDDS interfaces, all technical operations staff members are trained on the various infrastructure and software components of the system, and manpower resources are accounted for in the general Network Operations Center budget.

The research & development team of the Registry Backend Operator is aware of ICANN’s SSAC work regarding WHOIS (eg. http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄committees⁄security⁄sac051.pdf), and also participates in the IETF’s proposed “WEIRDS” working group, in order to stay up-to-date with developments in the fields of domain data related publication services.

The RDDS makes use of virtual machines on the hardware provisioned for the TLD (and described in responses to Question 32 and 24). Therefore, no additional hardware resources are needed, however, the required bandwith in order to provide the RDDS services are accounted for in the general network topology of the Registry System.

Introduction

The domain registration lifecycle of .wien follows ICANNs “Life Cycle of a Typical gTLD Domain Name” (http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄registrars⁄gtld-lifecycle.htm). By using this standard model lifecycle, Registrars have only minimal effort in order to become familiar with the registration procedures under the proposed TLD. Figure Q27-01 shows the lifecycle of a domain with the various states. The description below lists EPP status values, DNS status, and typical allowed transactions for each of the domain states. It also describes whether Whois information is available and what information is provided in a finger request (note: for reasons of clarity the transfer process is shown in a separate figure).

Since the registry system supports the Redemption Grace Period (RGP) extensions as specified in RFC 3915, the domain states ‘REDEMPTION’ and ‘PENDING DELETE’ refer to the respective RGP states.


Typical Lifecycle of a Registration

A typical domain lifecycle is initiated by a create domain EPP command for an AVAILABLE name. The domain is now in a ‘REGISTERED’ state. Whilst in this state the information associated with a domain may be updated by the respective registrar (using the update domain command). A domain may also be transferred to another registrar (domain transfer, see detailed state diagram below). A domain is always registered for a specific period (maximum 10 years). At any time Registrars can manually renew domains (given that the maximum registration period is not exceeded). The registry system is also supporting an auto-renew option. The auto-renew option can be deactivated on the request of a Registrar (on a per-Registrar basis), but is enabled by default to ensure that domains do not expire unintentionally.

When a domain is deleted by either the ‘delete domain’ command, or alternatively expires (not manually renewed and auto-renew disabled for the registrar), the domain first enters the ‘REDEMPTION’ state. Whilst in this state, a registrar is allowed to restore domains for the respective domain holder in case the non-renewal was unintentional. When the domain is successfully restored while in the REDEMPTION state (a restore report via EPP is required), the domain enters the ‘REGISTERED’ state again. Domains which are not restored after 30 days in the ‘REDEMPTION’ state enter the ‘PENDING DELETE’ state. Whilst in this state, a domain cannot be restored and will become AVAILABLE for re-registration after a period of 5 days.

Note that domains do not enter the ‘REDEMPTION’ state when they are deleted within the add grace period. Instead, such a domain is immediately deleted and AVAILABLE for re-registration. 

Furthermore, additional EPP status values set on a domain may affect the allowed transactions (operations), e.g. status values of serverUpdateProhibited or clientUpdateProhibited, serverTransferProhibited or clientTransferProhibited, serverDeleteProhibited or clientDeleteProhibited and serverRenewProhibited or clientRenewProhibited will prohibit the respective transaction. Such server states are for example used when a domain is LOCKED.

To discourage and to address problems with abusive registrations, the proposed registry will follow policies described in response to question 28.
For domains under dispute, the registry will use the LOCKED status, and will also set appropriate status values on the associated host and contact objects, as required by the specific dispute scenario (e.g. URS).

Domain States and Properties

This section describes the individual Domain States, as outlined in figure Q27-01. For each of these states, it is described what the trigger points to reach the status are, whether the domain is included in DNS, which transactions are allowed on the object, whether WHOIS information is available, and what the boolean response for the lightweight RDDS interface (finger) is. Furthermore the EPP (base and RGP) status values set on the domain are listed.

Note that in addition to the commands listed below “check domain” is always possible and the commands “info domain” and “transfer query” are always allowed on existing domain objects, regardless of their status.

Also note that in addition to the EPP status values listed below, the value “inactive” is set for domains without associated host objects.

AVAILABLE: 

Trigger points: Initial status of “new” domains, final deletion of a “PENDING DELETE” domain, deletion of a domain during Add Grace Period.
in DNS: No
Allowed Transactions: create domain
in WHOIS: No
Finger results: “available”
EPP status values: n⁄a

REGISTERED:

Trigger points: “create domain” command, Restore Report received, disputes resolved
in DNS: Yes(*)
Allowed Transactions: update domain, transfer domain (request), delete domain, renew domain
in WHOIS: Yes
Finger results: “unavailable”
EPP status values: serverTransferProhibited (during first 60 days), ok (after the first 60 days if not inactive and no other status value is set)

REDEMPTION:

Trigger points: “delete domain” command, domain expiration, disputes resolved, restore report not received.
in DNS: No
Allowed transactions: restore domain
in WHOIS: Yes
Finger result: “unavailable”
EPP Status values: pendingDelete, serverUpdateProhibited, serverHold, serverTransferProhibited, serverRenewProhibited, rgp:redemptionPeriod

PENDING DELETE:

Trigger points: domain not restored, delete locked domain
in DNS: no
Allowed Transactions: none
in WHOIS: Yes
Finger result: “unavailable”
EPP Status values: pendingDelete, serverUpdateProhibited, serverHold, serverTransferProhibited, serverRenewProhibited, rgp:pendingDelete

PENDING RESTORE:

Trigger points: “restore domain” command, dispute resolved
in DNS: Yes(*)
Allowed transactions: update domain (including delivery of the restore report), delete domain, renew domain. 
in WHOIS: Yes
Finger result: “unavailable”
EPP status values: pendingDelete, serverTransferProhibited, rgp:pendingRestore

LOCKED:

Trigger points: Opening of a dispute over the domain name
in DNS: Yes(**)
Allowed transactions: renew domain
in WHOIS: Yes
Finger result: “unavailable”
EPP status values: serverUpdateProhibited, serverDeleteProhibited, serverTransferProhibited, (serverHold**)

(*)Note: Domain is only included in the DNS if the domain object is linked to host object(s), and neither serverHold nor clientHold are set on the domain object.
(**)Note: Depending on the individual dispute case, the Registry may be instructed to set the serverHold flag on the domain, and subsequently, the name would be excluded from the DNS.

The EPP status values pendingCreate, pendingRenew and pendingUpdate are never set on domain objects since there is no human review or third-party action necessary to complete these actions.

Transfers

The transfer lifecycle of the proposed gTLDs complies with ICANNs “Policy on Transfer of Registrations between Registrars” (http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄transfers⁄policy-12jul04.htm), specifically to its Section 6 (Registry Requirements). The lifecycle is illustrated in Figure Q27-02.

A transfer request must have valid ‘authInfo’ in order to be successful. Note that only one transfer request for a domain can be pending at any one time. Transfer requests for a domain name object that is already in the “pending Transfer” state are hence rejected.

Additionally, only domains that have been registered for more than 60 days (counted from the date of the initial registration) can be transferred.

Pending transfers can be either approved or rejected by the currently sponsoring Registrar. After a period of 5 days, any un-actioned requests are auto-approved by the Registry. Pending transfers may also be cancelled by the requesting registrar.

In the “pending Transfer” state, the following transactions on a domain name are not allowed:

transfer (op=request)
delete

(update, renew, and all other transfer sub-commands are allowed). All EPP commands are specified in RFC 5731.

A successful transfer extends the validity period of the transferred domain. The default validity period extension is 1 year but clients may request longer periods in the “transfer op=request” command), between one and 10 years (whole years only; as always, the maximum registration period is capped at 10 years).

Host Objects

The lifecycle of host objects is contained in the response to this question because internal host objects can be affected by transactions on their respective superordinate domain (parent domain). They “follow” the status of their parent domain in order to avoid issues with stale glue records. 

Figure Q27-03 shows the lifecycle of internal host objects (comprised of a domain name in the .TLD namespace), and Figure Q27-04 shows the simpler lifecycle of an external host object (comprised of a domain name outside the of .TLD namespace). In Figure Q27-03, bold solid lines indicate states and transactions created by transactions on the host object itself, while dotted lines indicate effects on the internal host object that are created indirectly by transactions⁄states on the superordinate domain of the host object.

Internal host objects can only be created when the superordinate domain exists.
When the superordinate domain is deleted within the create grace period, the internal subordinate host is also immediately released.

The description of the individual states of the Host objects is as follows:

AVAILABLE: The host object does not exist in the Registry, and can be created using the “create host” EPP command.
REGISTERED: The host object exists, and can be used in domain names in order to refer to the domain name’s nameserver.

Internal hosts additionally follow the states of their respective superordinate domain as follows (Status values in the list below refer to the status of that domain):

REGISTERED (PENDING TRANSFER): The host object will be transferred together with the superordinate domain (in case the transfer is completed successfully).
REDEMPTION: For the redemption period of the superordinate domain, the host object glue will continue to be included in the TLD, even if the superordinate domain is not included in the zone anymore. 
PENDING DELETE: The glue record will not be included in the DNS anymore. On final deletion of the host object, all references to this host object will be removed too.

More information regarding this process in order to avoid stale glue records is included in response to Question 28 (Abuse Prevention and Mitigation).

Grace Periods

The following grace periods are supported for domains:

add grace period: the add grace period lasts 5 calendar days from the date of initial registration. When a domain is deleted in this period, it is immediately deleted and available for re-registration. The registrar is credited for an amount corresponding to the registration fee (unless the registrar is already over its monthly allowance of add grace transactions). A ‘renew’ command ends the add grace period. Note that it is impossible to perform a domain transfer in the add grace period (in fact, the first transfer is only allowed after 60 days of registration). To prevent misuse and domain tasting in particular, a policy applies as to the number of delete requests per month that are refunded during the add grace period (see below). Deletions in the add grace period exceeding this limit are not refunded. 
transfer grace period: the transfer grace period is currently 5 calendar days following a successfully completed domain transfer. If a domain is deleted in this timeframe, the sponsoring registrar is credited for the amount billed during the domain transfer. The transfer grace period is terminated when a restore, renew or subsequent domain transfer is performed. 
renew grace period: after each renew command, a 5 calendar day long renew grace period starts. When the domain is deleted in this timeframe, the registrar is credited for the corresponding fee and the domain enters REDEMPTION. A deletion, restoration or approved transfer of a domain immediately ends the renew grace period. 
auto-renew grace period: every auto-renew is followed by an auto-renew grace period (45 calendar days). If a domain is deleted or transferred within this period the fee for the renewal is refunded to the registrar. However, when a renew command is performed there is no grace period credit any more. 

Refunds for deleting domains during an add grace period will follow ICANN’s Add Grace Period Limits Policy, available at: http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄tlds⁄agp-policy-17dec08-en.htm (including implementation notes). 

The registry system supports the following pending periods in which certain operations are not allowed:

Redemption Grace Period: consisting of
** Redemption Period: Whilst in this 30 day period, a domain can be restored after a deletion action (only if domain is not within the add grace period) 
** Pending Restore: in order to successfully restore a domain in the redemption period, a restore report is required. This report has to be submitted within 7 days of this pending restore period. If no restore report is submitted, a new 30 day long redemption period begins. 
** Pending Delete: If a domain is deleted and not restored, it is placed into the pending delete period following the redemption period. After 5 days in this period, the domain is finally available for re-registration. 
Pending Transfer Period: lasts for a maximum of 5 days after the initial transfer request command. The losing registrar has 5 days to approve or reject the request. The requestor may also cancel the transfer within this period. If no action is taken by the losing or gaining registrar, the registry auto-approves the transfer.

This registration lifecycle matches the business model of the proposed gTLD. The proposed registry software fully supports this lifecycle and the technical resources needed to run a registry based on the lifecycle as described are readily available.

Resourcing

Three staff members of TLD-Box (the Registry Back-End Operator of the proposed gTLD) are experts in domain name life cycle, and have designed life cycles for the “.at”, “.bh” TLD, as well as consulted some other TLDs on their domain life cycle. 
All other technical staff members as well as support staff are trained on the operational aspects of the Domain Name Lifecycle. 

There are only minor staff and⁄or infrastructure resources needed for the day to day operations in relation to the domain lifecycle itself (since once developed, the resources to run the lifecycle come from resources operating the EPP servers). In terms of ongoing maintenance, it is expected that about 5 person days per year are required in order to clarify details, corner cases and relations to other business processes of the registry. Those 5 person days are budgeted for in the general maintenance time & resource budget of the registry.

1 Overview

Abusive activities during the operation of a gTLD registry system can be categorized as follows:

• Abusive registrations of names under a gTLD.
• Abusive use of a domain name under that gTLD („Malicious Use“)
• Abuse of the registration processes, the technical interfaces, infrastructure of the Registry systems and the DNS network itself.

With respect to the first (and also parts of the second) category, ICANN’s “RAP” WG (Registration Abuse Policies Working Group) has produced an illustrative categorization of known abuses in their “Registration Abuse Policies Working Group Final Report” (http:⁄⁄gnso.icann.org⁄issues⁄rap⁄rap-wg-final-report-29may10-en.pdf, dated 29 May 2010). The anti-abuse measures of the proposed gTLD registry largely follow the RAPWG’s recommendations for the individual abuse scenarios. More details on the individual countermeasures are included below.
 
Furthermore, the proposed registry also takes into consideration the ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee’s document “SAC 048” (“SSAC Comment on Orphan Glue Records in the Draft Applicant Guidebook”) as well as “SAC 023” (“Is the WHOIS Service a Source for email Addresses for Spammers?”).

2 General Provisions against Abuse under gTLD

2.1 Legal Safeguards

To meet the requirements of ICANN to a community-based designation of the application, the registrant must use the .WIEN domain in an economic, cultural, touristical, historic, social or any other meaningful connection to the Austrian capital WIEN.

This designation of .WIEN to the .WIEN Community will be enforced by specific language in the Registry-Registrar-Agreement that holds gTLD registrars responsible to include the restrictions as outlined above in respective agreements with their gTLD registrants.

The .WIEN Registry will, from time to time in its sole discretion or upon evidence or advice manually conduct continuing or recurring audits of domain names registered to ensure continued compliance with these requirements. Failure to comply will result in a notice providing 20-days to comply. Non-compliance following such a notice period may result in take-down of the relevant domain name, at the discretion of the Registry.

2.2 WHOIS Accuracy Measures

In parallel to auditing domain names for compliance with the eligibility requirements as outlined in 2.1, any such domain names will simultaneously also be checked for the accuracy of their WHOIS data.

3 Abuse Contact and Abuse Handling Provisions

The .WIEN registry operator will establish and publish a single abuse point of contact on its website. This contact is responsible for addressing matters requiring expedited attention and for providing a timely response to abuse complaints concerning all names registered in the .WIEN, through all registrars of record, including those involving a reseller.

The contact information for the abuse contact will consist of:

• an email address
• a phone number
• the postal address of the abuse contact (offices of the registry operator)

Communication submitted to the abuse contact will be handled as follows:

• review inbound communication for new abuse requests and⁄or ongoing cases
• treat remaining communication such as spam or non-applicable requests (e.g. for domains in other TLDs) appropriately, e.g. by discarding or rejecting it
• identify registrar of respective domain
• provide a preliminary response to the request’s originator
• approach registrar of record with the abuse case
• track abuse handling measures of registrar
• respond to originator with the outcome

Confirming receipt of communication and forwarding third-party communication is regularly handled during business hours, but after 24 hours at the latest. The initial time frame for the registrar of record to complete its abuse handling measures is 72 hours. Exceptionally and only at a registrar’s request this can be extended by another 24 hours. Details will be specified in the Registrar Accreditation Agreement.

4 Potential Registration Abuse Categories and Countermeasures

As outlined above ICANN’s RAPWG has identified a number of potential abuse categories (see chapter 5 of their document). These correspond to the first bullet point of the potential abuses of a Registry as listed in section 1 above (“Abusive Registrations”). The proposed registry system addresses these individual categories as follows:

4.1 Cybersquatting

Abuses from cybersquatting cases in the proposed .WIEN will be addressed by using ICANN’s existing and well know Uniform Dispute Resolution Process (“UDRP”). However, registry staff will also closely follow developments regarding Rights Protection Mechanisms within ICANN and will investigate potential paths towards adoption of such processes once they are clearly defined for the .WIEN registry space.

4.2 Front-Running

Even though the RAPWG does not recommend any specific action regarding this issue, the proposed registry will a) treat all logfiles and any other information that reflects user interests in a particular domain name as confidential. Such data and log information will only be available to staff with actual operational requirements to access those files, and b) will include a respective provision in the gTLD’s registrar accreditation agreement.

4.3 Gripe Sites; Deceptive and Offensive Domain Names

The gTLD registry will – in accordance with its contract with the City of Wien – develop best practices to restrict the registration of offensive strings. Additionally, it is believed that the existing UDRP, in addition to court decisions (which the registry will obviously be bound by) provides sufficient, independent action against such potentially abusive names.

4.4 Fake Renewal Notices

The registry will not, in line with the RAPWG’s recommendations, implement any specific countermeasure within its registry systems and services. As the registry is required to provide accurate and complete WHOIS information for all domain names (which is believed to be the information source for such notices) it is not feasible to implement such measures at this level. It is understood that ICANN continually monitors this issue and will take necessary countermeasures against registrars associated with such practices.

The registry will, however, post warnings on their website about any clearly fraudulent (and clearly illegal) renewal and expiration notices of which its staff becomes aware and will take legal measures against registrars performing such illegal, fraudulent acts.

4.5 Name Spinning

This is considered to be a practice employed mainly by registrars in a legitimate way to offer users more choice and⁄or alternatives should their desired name already be taken. As such, it is believed that it is within the registrar’s responsibility to use those techniques in a considered manner. In reality it is not possible for the registry to differentiate between a legitimate domain name request, say one manually entered by a user, and a domain name request that was “spun” by the registrar.

In the event that such name spinning practices could lead to trademark infringements on a domain name, the UDRP allows for appropriate action to be taken against the holder of such a name. This follows the RAPWG’s recommendation.

4.6 Pay-Per-Click

In agreement with the RAPWG’s position, this is considered to be an indirect and purely web related issue that does not have a direct relationship to the registration of domain names. In most cases, pay-per-click is a legitimate revenue source for domain name owners and web site operators. Any potential misuse of such practices must be out of scope for the Registry and again any trademark cases are expected to be brought using the UDRP.

4.7 Traffic Diversion

In accordance with the RAPWG’s position, this is again a web related issue and no specific countermeasures have been implemented within the registry’s operations.

4.8 Domain Kiting ⁄ Tasting

In order to prevent mass domain kiting ⁄ tasting (as it was observable in gTLD and ccTLD registries), the Registry will implement the “Add Grace Period Limits Policy” (http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄tlds⁄agp-policy-17dec08-en.htm), which efficiently removes the financial advantage of domain kiting ⁄ tasting and hence significantly reduces the volume of such registrations. All registrars will obviously be treated identically in this respect with no exemptions from that policy.

5 Abusive Use of a Domain Name

Corresponding to the second bullet in the list above (“Abusive Use”), the RAPWG has also provided an analysis in their Final Report. The Registry will apply a policy as outlined below:

5.1 Abuse Policy for gTLD

The intention of .WIEN’s Abuse Policy is to take action against the use of a domain name in conjunction with illegal, malicious, fraudulent or otherwise harmful activities on the Internet. Such activities comprise:

• Spam: Spam is generally defined as bulk unsolicited e-mail, but can also occur in instant messaging or mobile environments. Spam may be sent from domains, and spam is used to advertise Web sites.
• Phishing: Phishing is a website fraudulently presenting itself as a trusted site – often as a bank website – in order to deceive Internet users into divulging sensitive information (e.g. online banking credentials, email passwords).
• Pharming: Pharming is a redirection of Internet users to fraudulent websites, predominantly achieved by techniques like DNS hijacking or poisoning.
• Deliberate distribution of Malware: Malware is a piece of software that without the users’ consent infiltrates their system to harm it or e.g. use it for bot net activities. Examples are viruses, worms, Trojans or key logger.
• Malicious Fast-Flux hosting: Malicious Fast-Flux hosting is a DNS-based component of bot net activities in particular, to e.g. disguise the location on the Internet of these activities and to harden them against discovery and defense.

Any incoming communication about a potential abuse will be handled according to section 3 of the response to this question. Experts at the Registry Operator will then asses whether there is indeed an abuse at hand in conjunction with a gTLD domain name and of what kind it is. Subsequently the best method to tackle the issue will be derived from the initial assessment.

The main differences are a) whether the domain name has specifically been registered to commit the malicious activity or if this activity exploits a legitimate use of the domain name and its registrant is fully unaware of it, i.e. its website has been hacked – and b) whether there is a need for immediate action (domain is locked and removed from the delegation) or not (domain is locked only).

5.2 Handling of URS Requests

The registry Operator’s handling of Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS) requests is specified in detail in section 1.3 of the response to question #29.

6 Registry Interfaces Abuse

The registry will employ the following countermeasures to protect against abuses of the registry systems and the DNS network itself:

6.1 WHOIS data harvesting

WHOIS access is a critical and vital service provided by any gTLD registry and the Registry will obviously comply with ICANN’s requirements for WHOIS access.

However, as indicated in the SSAC’s document “Is the WHOIS Service a Source for email Addresses for Spammers?”, WHOIS abuse can be considered to be one of the primary means to generate email address lists for the purposes of sending unsolicited email, in particular the practice of mass harvesting information from the WHOIS. It is also believed that the WHOIS is the main source of data for generating fake renewal notices. To protect against harvesting of registration data (and particularly, email addresses), the registry will employ the following countermeasures:

• WHOIS query rate limits: All access to whois data will be query rate limited on a per-IP-address basis (for IPv4) and a per-prefix basis (for IPv6), with a daily limit of 25 WHOIS queries per IP address⁄prefix. Once this limit is reached, the WHOIS server responds with a relevant notification message instead of the standard WHOIS answer (The query limits may be reviewed and adapted by the Registry operator from time to time). IP-Ranges of accredited registrars (and other IP-ranges, eg. ICANN itself, UDRP and URS service providers etc) will be excluded from those rate limiting measures. This will allow legitimate usage of the service while at the same time make it very difficult to harvest data on a large scale.

• Email⁄Phone⁄Fax privacy: The EPP implementation of the “contact” object provides a mechanism that allows a registrar to define whether or not the “email”, “phone”, and “fax” fields of the contact object shall be publicly disclosed (i.e. “contact:disclose” element). The registry will set these fields to “do not disclose” by default, however, registrars can modify this setting via the normal EPP command stream. When a flag for a certain field is set to “do not disclose”, the respective field will be omitted from anonymous WHOIS outputs, providing a minimum level of privacy to registrants. To allow for various business processes, IP Ranges of accredited registrars (and other IP-ranges as needed, eg. ICANN itself, UDRP and URS service providers) will still need to see the full data set, including those fields marked as “do not disclose”.

• WHOIS monitoring: The WHOIS service will be monitored in order to identify unusual activity on the interface
The countermeasures above provide a well-balanced compromise between the requirements to provide access to WHOIS data and the basic data protection rights of registrants. More information about the WHOIS service provided by the registry is contained in response to Question 26.

6.2 EPP Interface Abuse

As described in the answers to the SRS, EPP and security questions (Question 24, 25 and 30, respectively), the EPP interfaces of the Registry are heavily firewalled, are only accessible from IP-ranges of accredited registrars and are protected by EPP authentication mechanisms. As such, abuse of those interfaces (such as DDoS, brute-force attacks against username⁄password combinations etc) can only be performed from networks of parties with which the Registry Operator has a legal agreement. Additionally, EPP interfaces are rate-limited at the network layer.

On top of the outlined technical means, usage figures beyond any regular and meaningful traffic patterns that are ongoing or recurring will be investigated by the Registry Operator. A lack of a decent explanation for such non-regular registrar behaviour on the EPP interface might lead to sanctions such as service degradation, interruption or even termination to the extend possible it is provided for in the Registrar Accreditation Agreement.

6.3 DNS Interface Abuse

Public nameservers, hidden masters and the signing infrastructure is configured and firewalled so that they allow NOTIFYs and UPDATEs from the required addresses only. In order to prevent zone walking and load peaks, zone transfers from the DNS infrastructure are disabled.

7 Management and removal of orphan glue records

It is understood, that inline with the SSAC’s comments in http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄committees⁄security⁄sac048.pdf, glue records have a vital function in the correct and normal operation of the DNS but that they can also be used for malicious purposes.

In order to prevent such malicious usage, the registry performs glue record management in accordance with the following policy:

• Provisioning of host objects with glue: In line with the EPP RFCs, glue record (“internal”) host objects can only be provisioned when the superordinate (parent) domain name exists in the registry. Host objects that are not under the TLD managed by the registry (“external hosts”) can never have A or AAAA records
• Deletion of domain with subordinate glue record hosts: When a domain name transitions from a “REGISTERED” to a “REDEMPTION” status (for example, via the EPP “delete domain” command, or via expiration), the domain name itself is removed from the DNS, however any glue records under the deleted domain are kept in the zone temporarily. Other registrars who are affected by a potential impact on DNS service due to the upcoming removal of the host from their domains are notified via the EPP message queue.
• Subsequently, when the domain name transitions from a “REDEMPTION” to a “PENDING DELETE” status, the glue records under the affected domain name are revoked from the DNS, but still exist in the SRS database.
• In the last step of the deletion process (transition from “PENDING DELETE” to “AVAILABLE”), the glue record host objects are deleted together with the domain and are also removed from any other domain name in the registry that still uses those hosts.
This policy effectively prevents misuse of orphan glue records in the registry since the status of a host object always follows the status of the superordinate domain. As a result glue records can never exist for domains that are not in the registry database. Additionally, keeping the glue records in the zone during the redemption period together with notification to Registrars significantly reduces the risk of other domains being impacted and reduces the effort required by a registrar in the event that the domain is subsequently restored.

However, in addition to this procedural policy outlined above, the registry operator will also act on documented evidence that glue records are present and used in connection with malicious activity by subsequently removing such glue records manually.

8 Ressourcing Plan

The Registry operator expects a domain name volume in the first three years of operations of .WIEN as listed in response #46. It will plan staffing needs based on these figures and install abuse response functions which will likely consist of internal and outsourced staff. The planned functions for .WIEN are based on nic.at’s experience with the management of abuse complaints. The abuse response staff will be able to swiftly investigate abuse complaints and to react accordingly.

8.1 CERT.at is a department of the backend provider

It is important to note that the Austrian CERT (Computer Security Emergency Response Team, see http:⁄⁄www.cert.at⁄), staffed with 5 full-time-equivalents is a department within nic.at and shares offices with the registry operations team. Hence, world class security and anti-abuse expertise is committed to be available literally „next door“ to the registry operations centre.

As required by specification 7 of the new gTLD Agreement, the Registry Operator will implement and strictly adhere to any rights protection mechanisms („RPMs“) that are mandated by ICANN. All mandated and independently developed RPMs will be included in the Registry-Registrar Agreement for .WIEN. The Registry Operator will implement all required RPMs described in the Trademark Clearinghouse („TMCH“) function (once adopted by ICANN) and understands that ICANN may revise such requirements from time to time.

But as the detailed implementation of the TMCH function is still unspecified to a greater extent, the Registry Operator is only able to outline its intentions for the Sunrise phase for the .WIEN Community. Implementation details, e.g. as to what extent it possibly could be intertwined with the TMCH Sunrise phase instead of being held separately afterwards, need to be developed and if necessary adjusted as the circumstances with the TMCH functions proceed.

The Registry Operator will comply with PDDRP, RRDRP and URS procedures, and will implement and adhere to the remedies ICANN imposes via those processes.

The Registry Operator will also take reasonable steps to investigate and respond to any reports from law enforcement, governmental and quasi-governmental agencies of illegal conduct under the TLD, and understands that the Registry Operator will not be required to take any action that contradicts applicable law.

Details about the implementation of the various rights protection mechanisms are included below. 


Safeguard Against Violation of the TLDs Eligibility Restrictions

To meet the requirements of ICANN to a community-based designation of the application, the registrant must use the .WIEN domain in connection to the Community as defined in Question 20.

The .WIEN Registry will, from time to time, in its sole discretion or upon evidence or advice conduct continuing or recurring manual audits of domain names registered to ensure continued compliance with these requirements. Failure to comply will result in a notice providing 20-days to comply. Non-compliance following such a notice period may result in take-down of the relevant domain name, at the discretion of the Registry.

The Registry is entitled to lock, cancel, initiate the gTLD-deletion cycle or transfer domain names that do not meet the registration criteria. It will set up a process for any questions and challenges that may arise from registrations. Complainants will be provided a single point of contact via the Registry’s website to submit any questions and complaints regarding alleged abuse. The Registry also follows the standard dispute policies as defined in Q 28 and Q 39. 

In detail the following measures will be carried out by the Registry to enforce the policies:

- Policies against domain name abuse and an Eligibility Requirements Dispute Resolution Policy (ERDRP)
- Dispute Policy based on local law
- Anti-Abuse Policies

By these policies the Registry is allowed to block, delete or transfer domain names.


UDRP Support

It is understood that ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Process (UDRP) is largely concerned with registrars. Hence, the Registry Operator does not need to implement any specific process in order to support the UDRP specifically. However, the Registry Operator will support registrars in UDRP cases involving domain names under the TLD and will cooperate with approved Dispute Resolution Service Providers in order to assist in their work.


URS Support

The Registry Operator will comply with ICANN’s requirements regarding the Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS) process and understands that the following services are required (and will be provided) during the operation of .WIEN:

Contact information: the Registry Operator will provide email and other contact information to accredited URS-DRPs (Dispute Resolution Provider) so that notices and other communication regarding URS cases can be communicated efficiently.

Notice and locking of a domain: Upon receipt of a respective Notice from an accredited URS provider, the Registry Operator will “lock” the affected domain name within 24 hours by means of putting it into the LOCKED status. This means that modifications (including transfers) on the domain name and registration data will be rejected but the name will still resolve in the DNS. The Registry Operator will immediately notify the URS-DRP upon locking the domain.

Remedies: In order for the URS-DRP to implement the Remedy, the Registry Operator will subsequently modify the registration (for example, by changing nameservers to the URS-DRP’s own hosts) or remove the LOCKED status on the domain or implement other such measures as instructed by the URS-DRP.

Extend Registration: the Registry Operator will support successful Complainants if they wish to extend the registration period for one year at commercial rates. 

The Registry Operator wishes to note that authentication of URS-DRP is a critical issue since Notices and other instructions may be sent via email to the Registry Operator and email itself does not provide any means of authentication. Hence, additional measures such as cryptographically signing such emails will be deemed necessary in order to identify a Notice as authentic and subsequently authorize requests to the Registry Operator.


PDDRP

The Registry Operator agrees to participate in the procedures required by the Post-Delegation Dispute Resolution Procedure (PDDRP) and be bound to all determinations that are the result of said procedures. The process implemented by the Registry Operator for actual complaints will be as follows:

Once a Complaint is received electronically or in paper notice form from the Provider, the Registry Operator will verify the content requirements of the Complaint, according to section 7.2 of the current PDDRP specification (dated Sep 19 2011). The Complaint will be reviewed by legal staff of the Registry Operator.

The Registry Operator will notify the Provider about the receipt of a complaint.
If deemed necessary, the Registry Operator will submit papers within 10 days of receipt of the Complaint.

Registry Operator will subsequently follow the process regarding implementation of the remedies, as described in the PDDRP specification.


RRDRP

The Registry Operator agrees to participate in the procedures required by the Registration Restriction Dispute Resolution Policy (RRDRP) and be bound to the determinations that are the result of said procedures, in accordance to Section 2a of Specification 7 of the New gTLD Agreement. The actual administrative steps for handling Complaints based on the RRDRP will be identical, process-wise, to the PDDRP process described above.


Trademark Claims (Clearinghouse)

It is understood that – according to the Trademark Clearinghouse („TMCH“) definition dated Jan 12 2012 – ICANN is going to define a TMCH provider who will in turn supply two primary functions (see Section 1.2 of the document), of which function (ii) (“serving as a database to provide information to new gTLDs”) will be directly relevant to the operation of this TLD.

It is also understood that ICANN’s work towards the establishment of such a TMCH is still in progress. Therefore, it is not yet possible to describe the actual process and technical interfaces by which the Registry will support the TMCH requirements.

The Registry Operator will, however, implement any reasonable measures and processes that are required by the TMCH function.


Sunrise Services

The .WIEN Registry intends to perform two Sunrise phases starting with a Community specific Sunrise period (“Wien Sunrise”) followed by a standard Sunrise period using the Trademark Clearinghouse provisions.

1. Registration in the “Wien Sunrise”

As part of its intended service for the Community of .WIEN, the Registry Operator intends to implement a Community specific Sunrise period (“Wien Sunrise”), where applicants will be validated using an own validation procedure. Eligible are all registrants who meet the eligibility criteria of the gTLD described in Question 20 and whose trademarks are valid according to the .WIEN Sunrise Policies for this phase. The Sunrise period has a duration of 30 days; names with multiple registrations will be auctioned.

2. Registration in the “Trademark Clearinghouse” Sunrise

As part of its intended general service, the Registry Operator intends to implement a Sunrise period, where applicants will be validated using the Trademark Clearinghouse services. Eligible are all registrants who meet the eligibility criteria of .WIEN described in Question 20 and whose trademarks were validated by the Trademark Clearinghouse. The Sunrise period has a duration of 30 days; names with multiple registrations will be auctioned.

The current draft .WIEN Sunrise Policy will be completed and ⁄ or in parts be replaced by the mandatory rules of the ICANN Trademark Clearinghouse as soon as they become available.

Timing of the phased registration:

D(-)180 - information on the registration phase. 3-6 months before the expected approval of the .WIEN, the Registry informs the public, administration, media and associations and chambers of the planned Sunrise and other procurement phases.

D0 - Approval of the .WIEN top-level domain by ICANN

D30 to D60 - Implementation of “Wien Sunrise” period. During a period of 30 days, the Registry will receive requests for domain registrations via ICANN accredited registrars and conduct a review of the applications received. 

D60-D80 – Cooling off period; auction of names with multiple registrations.

D80 to D110 - Implementation of the Trademark Clearinghouse Sunrise period. During a period of 30 days, the Registry will receive requests for domain registrations via ICANN accredited registrars and conduct a review of the applications received.

D110-D130 – Cooling off period; auction of names with multiple registrations.

D130 - Start of the general registration period (Landrush)


Requirements and Restrictions

Those wishing to register their marks in the .WIEN domain during the TMCH Sunrise Phase must own a current trademark or service mark listed in the TMCH. Eligible are all registrants who meet the eligibility criteria of .WIEN described in Question 20.

Notice will be provided to all trademark holders in the TMCH if someone is seeking a Sunrise registration. This notice will be provided to holders of marks in the TMCH that are an Identical Match (as defined in the TMCH) to the name to be registered during Sunrise.
Sunrise registration will require a minimum term of five years.

An application is only considered complete when the applicant provides the Registry, via a registrar, with at least the following information:

a) the full name of the applicant; where no name of a company or organisation is specified, the individual requesting registration of the domain name is considered the Applicant; if the name of the company or the organisation is specified, then the company or organisation is considered the applicant;
- Address and country of the registered office, central administration or principal place of business of the applicants organization, or
b) the full name, address, and the land of an administrative contact person (natural person);
c) the e-mail addresses of the applicant or his representative and the administrative contact;
d) telephone and fax number by which the applicant or his representative and the administrative contact can be reached;
e) the requested domain;
f) the complete name for which a Prior Right is claimed;
g) the type of Prior Right claimed by the applicant;
h) the country in which the Prior Right claimed is protected.

The information referred to (f) and (h) above is deemed to constitute the legal basis in national or Community law for the claimed Prior Right to the name. 

The Domain Name applied must consist of the complete name for which a Prior Right is claimed.
The Registry is entitled to exchange the above information with the Validation Agent(s) (including their agents and subcontractors) in order to effect validation of the rights claimed.


Other Reports

The following will be memorialized and be made binding via the Registry-Registrar and Registrar-Registrant Agreements:

- The registry may reject a registration request or a reservation request, or may delete, revoke, suspend, cancel, or transfer a registration or reservation under the following criteria:
a. to enforce registry policies and ICANN requirements; each as amended from time to time;
b. that is not accompanied by complete and accurate information as required by ICANN requirements and⁄or registry policies or where required information is not updated and⁄or corrected as required by ICANN requirements and⁄or registry policies;
c. to protect the integrity and stability of the registry, its operations, and the TLD system;
d. to comply with any applicable law, regulation, holding, order, or decision issued by a court, administrative authority, or dispute resolution service provider with jurisdiction over the registry;
e. to establish, assert, or defend the legal rights of the registry or a third party or to avoid any civil or criminal liability on the part of the registry and⁄or its affiliates, subsidiaries, officers, directors, representatives, employees, contractors, and stockholders;
f. to correct mistakes made by the registry or any accredited registrar in connection with a registration; or
g. as otherwise provided in the Registry-Registrar Agreement and⁄or the Registrar-Registrant Agreement.


Dispute-related Technical Functionality in the Registry System

In order to handle any disputes concerning a domain in the .WIEN zone according to the RPMs defined, the Registry Administration Panel (a web-based interface to the SRS to query and manipulate registry data) includes functionality to manually put domains into the “LOCKED” status (see Answer to question 27 – Registration Lifecycle). The dispute related functions are based on more than 12 years of experience in managing disputes under the “.at” TLD and provide the following functionality:


Search for domain names and display WHOIS as well as registrar data

For each domain, the following tasks can be performed:

** Delete the domain immediately (domain immediately enters PENDING DELETE state and thus cannot be restored by a registrar)
** Put the domain into the LOCKED state (which prevents modifications and transfers on the domain name, and also prohibits modifications on the associated registrant contact)
** Add the “serverHold” status to domain names under LOCKED (so that the name is excluded from the DNS, and hence technically disabled)
** Remove the “serverHold” status from a LOCKED domain
** Put domain names in LOCKED state back to their previous state (most commonly, REGISTERED).
** For each action, the system allows users to select one of several “reasons” to be recorded with the action.
** An additional free-form text box allows users to record additional information, such as pointers to external documents, or case numbers.
List all domain names in LOCKED status
Display data, reasons, and additional information of domains in LOCKED state
Display historical data about such cases


Resourcing Plan for Implementation and Ongoing Maintainance

Basic functionality regarding rights protections mechanisms (domain locking, tracking of requests) is already implemented in the registry core system, hence no further resources are needed for this initial implementation. 

However, it is understood that resources are necessary to implement further measures that require technical interaction with the registry system, as soon as they are clearly defined (especially the TMCH process and sunrise). The implementation effort cannot be foreseen at the time of writing, hence the concrete resourcing plan for the technical part of the implementation and ongoing maintenance cannot be provided. However, the Registry Operator is aware of the fact that during landrush and sunrise more resources will be allocated to handle the increased load on the day to day operations as well performing necessary changes on the system after completion of sunrise and landrush if instructed by ICANN rules to do so. 

Still, the Registry Operator will implement any reasonable measures and processes that are required by ICANN in respect to rights protection and resources will be allocated accordingly to have the functionality available for the operation of the registry.

Registry Policy Framework

The Information Security Management System was developed in accordance with the international standard ISO 27001 and the registry backend operator is currently on the ISO 27001 certification path for the Information Security Management System (ISMS) to be completed before launching the registry. For the secondary datacenter in Salzburg the certification will be completed in 2012 and the primary datacenter in Vienna is already certified – please find ISO 27001 certification document in attachment 30a-06.

Registry Back-end Operator Security Organization

The role of the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) is defined in the organization operating the registry back-end, and is staffed with an FTE. This person is responsible for the setup, operation and continuous improvement of the Information Security Management System and Business Continuity Management System. 

In the organization chart the CISO is located directly below senior management. This role is independent of operational management and directly reports to the upper management of the registry backend operator who in turn reports to the registry operator’s management. The CISO advises the management on all security related issues.

Information Security Management System (ISMS):

The ISO 27001 based ISMS supports and facilitates management in achieving the goals defined in the Corporate Security Policy and Security Standard. The ISMS as shown in diagram Q30a-1 provides the Deming cycle (plan-do-check-act) in security concerns as referred to in ISO 27001.

The Security Policy Framework and Security Standard have a review cycle of a maximum of 1 year. The CISO is responsible for adhering to this review cycle.

Business Continuity Management System (BCMS)

Please find further details on BCMS in response to question 39.

Corporate Security Policy

The Corporate Security Policy is understood as the commitment by upper management to support and maintain information and IT security.

The main items are:

The overall goal of these activities is to prevent security incidents and to minimize their impact.
Prevention before damage reduction; personal responsibility and awareness before surveillance of employees.
Information security and IT security are important quality metrics for the registry.
Information security and IT security are core competences of the registry.
Safeguarding the integrity and availability of the gTLDs Domain Name System
In the event of a security incident to minimize any potential damage. 

Corporate Security Standard

The Corporate Security Standard, based on ISO 27001, defines the areas of responsibility for information – and IT security:

IT Risk Management
Continuous Improvement Process
Audit Management
IT Asset Management
Information Classification and Processing
IT Change Management
Identity and Access Management
Personal Management
Security Incident Management
IT Project Management
IT Patch and Update Management
Backup and Recovery
Logging and Monitoring
Spam and Antivirus
Mobile Devices
Media Disposal
Network Security
Physical Security
External Suppliers

These areas will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. 

IT Risk Management

Diagram Q30a-2 describes the risk management process in use at the registry.

The evaluation of risks is performed according to 4 different category types: 

Finance: assesses any potential financial impact on the registry.
Operating Tasks: assesses the influence on the main business processes or tasks of the registry.
Corporate Image: assesses the effects of reputational damage or loss of trust in the registry.
Compliance: assesses impact of contractual or legal damages.

The risks are evaluated and categorized into the following severity levels:

Critical
High
Medium
Low

The risks are further measured by their estimated frequency of occurrence:

Very high probability: 1 per month or more frequently
High probability: 1 per year
Possible: every 10 years
Highly unlikely: every 100 years
Impossible: risk is not relevant (for example avalanches in Vienna)

The risk assessment is performed using the Delphi technique and involves management, the CISO and the head of IT. Within each category the worst cases are rated as the most important ones.

Aspects of risk management are also used for the vulnerability management.

ISO27001
Domain Name
6 Organization of information security
6.1 Internal organization
6.2 External parties
12 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance
12.6 Technical vulnerability management

Continuous Improvement Process

The continuous improvement process is risk-management oriented, and shown in Figure Q30a - 3: Continuous Improvement process. 

Regular organizational meetings are set up to trigger the process:

IT security update: 
** Participants: Head of IT, CISO
** Topics: Operational tasks
** Frequency: At least every 2 weeks
Security jour fixe: 
** Participants: CTO, CISO, optional head of IT
** Topics: Planning, monitoring of projects, tasks, countermeasures
** Frequency: At least every month
Management security jour fixe: 
** Participants: CEO, CTO, CISO, optional head of IT
** Topics: Risk management, large-scale management decisions

The management review has to take place at least once per year or as needed in the event that a potential risk arises.

Audit Management

The planning of all audit work including technical audits such as penetration tests and vulnerability scans is managed by the CISO.

Different kinds of technical security audits are accomplished:

Regular basis
** Vulnerability scans on systems at operating system level to identify problems in patch management or configuration processes
** Penetration tests are executed by third party security consultants to identify design issues, organizational deficits or other security issues. The focus of the penetration tests is varied every year.
** Web vulnerability scans (OWASP Top 10) are performed against all internal and external websites
Prior to the launch of a new system:
** Penetration testing of all business critical system elements
** Vulnerability scans on the system at an operating system level
** Web vulnerability scan (if the system is web-based)

ISO27001
Domain Name
6 Organization of information security
6.1 Internal organization
6.2 External parties
15 Compliance
15.1 Compliance with legal requirements
15.2 Compliance with security policies and standards, and technical compliance
15.3 Information systems audit considerations

 

IT Asset Management

All assets and their lifecycles are fully documented. Assets are categorized as follows:

Physical assets
Software assets
Information assets

ISO27001
Domain Name
7 Asset Management 
7.1 Responsibility for assets
7.2 Information classification
8 Human resource security
8.3 Termination or change of employment

Information Classification

All information is classified into the following categories:

Public: For example data on public websites
Internal: For example general company information
Confidential: For example annual business reports before publication
Highly confidential: For example person specific data, penetration testing reports

The data classification policy defines how to store, transmit and share these different kinds of information.

ISO27001
Domain Name
7 Asset management
7.1 Responsibility of assets
7.2 Information classification 
10 Communications and operations management
10.7 Media handling
10.8 Exchange of information
12 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance
12.3 Cryptographic controls
15 Compliance
15.1 Compliance with legal requirements

 

IT Change Management

IT change management ensures that all modifications to IT systems can be reproduced, fulfill the organizational needs and are documented. Changes are categorized into following groups:

Changes without approval
** Below low risk
** Implemented within 1 week
Standard change
** Low risk
** Implemented within 1 month
Emergency change
** If availability of a service is dependent on a specific change
** Has to be done as soon as possible
** Can’t be scheduled any more
** Escalation to management is required

ISO27001
Domain Name
10 Communications and operations management
10.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities
12 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance
12.6 Security in development and support processes

 

Identity and Access Management

All user rights are based on the “least privilege” and “need to know” principle. Roles are used to group the relevant user permissions where appropriate.

User accounts are personal accounts meaning that they identify one specific person. Group or role accounts are non-standard and have to be approved in writing by the CISO.

Administrative accounts have to be approved by the head of IT in writing. There are stronger policies, for example password policies.

External accounts (for third parties) also need written approval by the CISO. These types of accounts are deactivated after 30 days.

External administrative accounts need written approval by the head of IT and the CISO. Such accounts are subject to increased monitoring and logging. These types of accounts are also deactivated after 30 days by default.

If an employee leaves the company, his⁄her account is deactivated immediately. 

Inactive accounts are deleted after 60 days.

At least once a year there is a review of the accounts structure and user rights permissions performed by analyzing a sample of accounts.

ISO27001
Domain Name
11 Access controls
11.1 Business requirement for access control
11.2 User access management
11.3 User responsibility
11.5 Operating system access control
11.6 Application and information access control

Personnel Management

Checklists exist for employee entry and exit activities. Every new employee is added to these lists and registered. All new employees have to prove that they have not been previously prosecuted and do not have a criminal record which means that there are no relevant records in the police records (Strafregisterauszug). Every employee must attend a security awareness course.

Background checks for security personnel

All Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) members and the CISO are background security checked by the Federal Ministry of Interior (§55 Sicherheitspolizeigesetz). 

ISO27001
Domain Name
8 Human resource security
8.1 Prior to employment
8.2 During employment
8.3 Termination or change of employment

Security Incident Management

A sister company of the registry backend operator also operates a CERT. This team consists of one Junior Security Analyst and a minimum of five Senior Security Analysts with at least 5 years and up to 15 years experience in IT Security. 

This team also operates the national CERT for the Republic of Austria (CERT.at) and together with the Federal Chancellery of the Republic of Austria, the Austrian Government CERT (GovCERT Austria). It is internationally accredited as a Forum of Incident Response Member (FIRST) and a Trusted Introducer. By achieving these memberships the registry has built an excellent formal and informal information network. As a result the registry is well prepared for the prevention of and response to security incidents.

Figure Q30a – 4 the Security Incident Management Process is described.

Classification for the triage of security incidents

Urgency:

Immediate: Reaction within 1h, invoke crisis organization if necessary
Soon: Reaction within 8h or on the next business day
Normal: Equivalent to a systems change, defined by change management procedures

Impacts:

Critical
High
Middle
Low

ISO27001
Domain Name
13 Information security incident management
13.1 Reporting information security events and weaknesses
13.2 Management of information security incidents and improvements

 

IT Project Management

A specific project management methodology has been defined.

ISO27001
Domain Name
6 Organization of information security
6.2 Internal organization
10 Communications and operations management
10.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities
10.3 System planning and acceptance
12 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance
12.1 Security requirements of information systems
12.5 Security in development and support processes

IT Patch and Update Management

A formal vulnerability and patch management process has been defined (shown in Figure Q30a - 5: Vulnerability Management). 

Patches are classified as: 

Critical (remediation within hours)
Non critical (remediation by the next patch day)

All patches are fully tested prior to being deployed. 

The effectiveness of the patching process is audited by vulnerability scans and by matching the actual software inventory with vulnerability databases.

Reports are discussed on a regular basis by management in order to guarantee continuous improvement.

ISO27001
Domain Name
10 Communications and operations management
10.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities
12 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance
12.5 Security in development and support processes
12.6 Technical Vulnerability Management

Backup and Recovery

A full backup and recovery framework is in place. For details see the answer to question 37.

ISO27001
Domain Name
10 Communications and operations management
10.5 Back Up 
15 Compliance
15.1 Compliance with legal requirements

Logging and Monitoring

A logging and monitoring solution is in operation to identify malicious activities and unauthorized access. All authorized access is also logged.

All servers and systems are time synced using the Network Time Protocol (NTP).

The level of detail of logging:

Varies with expected risks
Requirements of business processes
Requirements of data integrity and confidentiality

Minimum details are

User ID
Date and time
Type of access
Software
Non-authorized access
** Not working action
Administrator actions
** System start and stop
** Change of system configuration
** Activation and de-activation of security components
Security components alarms
Error protocol
Security protocol, for example anti virus software

All relevant systems of the gTLD registry are controlled by a host-based intrusion detections system (HIDS). All events are logged on a central device.

The HIDS allows to: 

Check of host integrity.
Check of file integrity.
Port monitoring
Programs using specific ports
Process checks
Login⁄logoff

The HIDS and the other log sources are integrated into a central monitoring tool. This tool can trigger certain events.

Analysis of logging and monitoring information is performed continuously to detect security incidents and performed as needed in the event of a security incident.

ISO27001
Domain Name
10 Communications and operations management
10.2 Third party service delivery management
10.10 Monitoring 
15 Compliance
15.1 Compliance with legal requirements

Spam and Antivirus

All office systems are protected by anti malware software. Servers are checked on a regular basis, if real time protection is not possible.

ISO27001
Domain Name
10 Communications and operations management
10.4 Protection against malicious and mobile code
10.6 Network security management
13 Information security incident management
13.1 Reporting information security events and weaknesses

Mobile Devices

All smartphones and mobile devices (for example notebooks) must use full hard disk encryption if technically possible. If possible it should be combined with remote wipe functionality.

The actual standard for smartphones is to use Blackberry devices with a corporate policy.

Every loss of a device has to be reported to the IT department as soon as possible.

ISO27001
Domain Name
7 Asset management
7.1 Responsibility for assets
11 Access control
11.7 Mobile computing and teleworking

Media Disposal

Information in paper form must be shredded if it is classified as confidential or higher. 

Hard disk drives (HDD) and other storage media are deleted or destroyed in conformance with policy requirements.

For example:

Overwrite HDDs multiple times with random data
Shredder CDs

Media disposal policies apply to all relevant devices, e.g. also HDDs in printer or other media devices.

ISO27001
Domain Name
9 Physical and environmental security
9.2 Equipment security
10 Communications and operations management
10.7 Media handling

Network Security

The aspects of integrity, confidentiality and availability are considered as essential aspects in our network design.

Integrity, confidentiality:

Encryption on network layers between:
** Data centers
** Offices and data centers

Availability

Redundant physical paths via multiple carriers

Access to the network itself is restricted by means of security zone definitions, for example no direct connection is available to the corporate network from visitor meeting rooms etc.

All controls are audited on a regular basis, for example by penetration tests.

ISO27001
Domain Name
10 Communications and operations management
10.6 Network security management
11 Access control
11.4 Network Access Control 
12 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance
12.3 Cryptographic controls

Physical Security

The physical security risks are again evaluated on an annual basis.

The gTLD systems themselves are operated in two different data centers with state-of the art security provisions in place, e.g. heavily restricted access to data center and locked racks.

For details see answer to question 39.

ISO27001
Domain Name
9 Physical and environmental security 
9.1 Secure areas
9.2 Equipment security

External Suppliers

For external suppliers either the same restrictions as those for internal personnel or further restrictions are applied.

Domain Name
6 Organization of information security
6.2 External parties
10 Communications and operations management
10.2 Third party service delivery management